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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to the generation of 
electrical power from nuclear power plants in the U.S. Perhaps this is motivated by 
the catastrophic effects on the ecology of burning fossil fuel for energy production. So 
far, the efforts have mainly been put into research and development of new nuclear 
reactor designs. In the new designs, the shortcomings of the old designs are recognized 
and corrected by exploring latest technologies. 
By performing the safety analysis of typical nuclear power plants in operation to­
day, it has been found that the largest contributing factor in most accidents is human 
error. The automation of control of new nuclear power plants is then a step in the 
right direction. In an effort to automate the plant operation in normal or abnormal 
situations, the field of artificial intelligence (AI) has been explored extensively. 
In this project we have been taking part in this effort by developing an ES for 
diagnosing failed fuel elements in EBR-II. Before the scope of this project is outlined, 
it is perhaps useful to familiarize the reader with EBR-II, to define ES, and to describe 
the generic basis for developing an ES. 
Plant Layout of EBR-II 
"Now in its third decade of operation, EBR-II continues to serve the na­
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tion as a facility for testing fuels, materials, and instruments of interest to 
the breeder reactor community. In addition, it has assumed an important 
role in plant systems testing. Designed and build with the technologies of 
the 1950s and 1960s, EBR-II stands as a tribute to those scientists and en­
gineers whose imagination, competence, and initiative have transformed 
a visionary concept into operational reality" [1]. 
The plant layout of EBR-II is depicted in Figure 1.1, and in Figure 1.2, a cut­
away view with the primary cooling system is shown. A brief description of its 
operation is given in the following discussion. The EBR-II plant consists of three 
principal facilities that house the reactor, steam generation system, and power plant. 
Heat generated in the core is removed by sodium coolant which is pumped through 
the core, into a primary-to-secondary heat exchanger, and discharged directly to 
the sodium filled primary tank. The heated secondary coolant is pumped from the 
heat exchanger to the sodium-boiler building where steam is produced and super­
heated. The superheated steam, in turn, is used to drive a turbine-generator located 
in the power plant building. Condensate along with makeup water is returned to 
the sodium-boiler building for steam generation. After losing its heat to the steam 
generation system, secondary coolant is pumped back to the heat exchanger in the 
reactor tank to complete the cycle. In effect, the reactor is a 62.5MW^ source of heat 
which is used to provide steam for electrical power generation. 
A feature original with the design of EBR-II is the pool-type concept, based on 
the complete submersion under molten sodium of the reactor core, reflector, blanket, 
neutron shield, primary pumps, primary piping, heat exchanger, and in-vessel fuel 
handling equipment. The primary role of EBR-II is now focused on development 
Figure 1.1: Principal EBR-II facilities. Shown from left to right are the sodium 
boiler, the reactor and its containment building, and the power plant 
building 
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Figure 1.2: Cutaway view of EBR-II reactor and primary cooling system 
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and testing of metallic and oxide fuel for the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) concept 
at Argonne National Laboratory. The IFR concept is one of the primary candidates 
for the new generation of nuclear power plants in the U.S. EBR-II is being used for 
plant dynamics testing to demonstrate passive (inherent) safety features and passive 
control capabilities of a metal fueled, liquid metal cooled fast reactor. Ultimately, 
the knowledge gained in EBR-II will be incorporated in the final development of the 
IFR concept. The newest area of work at EBR-II is in the development and testing of 
computer-based diagnostic techniques. The concepts developed in this work may be 
extended so that the methods can be used not only in the liquid metal fast breeder 
reactors, but also in light water reactors which are commercially in use today in the 
U.S. for power generation. 
Introduction to Expert Systems 
AI is the part of computer science concerned with designing intelligent computer 
systems, that is, systems that exhibit the characteristics we associate with intelli­
gence in human behavior (e.g., understanding language, learning, reasoning, solving 
problems) [2], 
With all the research done to this day, the AI field still has not yet accomplished 
its stated task of creating programs that exhibit reasoning and learning processes 
similar to humans. However, it must be noted that the shortcomings of the AI field 
are mostly blamed on the lack of understanding of how the human brain actually 
works. To this day, AI researchers have had to guess on how a human brain works. 
It has been stated [3], 
"Although the AI field has been an active one for more than 25 years. 
6 
AI researchers still have no idea how to create a truly intelligent com­
puter. No existing programs can recall facts, solve problems, reason, 
learn, or process language with anything approximating human facility. 
This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to 
human brains but because we do not yet know how human intelligence is 
organized." 
On the other hand, it is ironic that the psychology field has actually used some 
AI concepts to develop psychological theories, as is also stated in Anderson [3]. 
"• • • observing how we could analyze the intelligent behavior of a machine 
has largely liberated us from our inhibitions and misconceptions about 
analyzing our own intelligence." 
Nevertheless, one can not deny the successes of research in the AI field. As a 
matter of fact, in the beginning of the 1970s, it was believed that the capability to 
produce a program which has human-like intelligence compatibilities was imminent 
[4], but difficulties were encountered in generalizing these successes into flexible, in­
telligent programs. Even with the 1970s computers, which had larger memory and 
much increased computer speed than those of the 1960s, it was soon found that AI 
programs exhausted computer memory, or that the execution time became too long. 
This led the AI field to produce more efficient methods for solving AI problems, which 
in turn led to the introduction of the first commercial product, the ES. A new era 
in AI history began, augmented by the development of MYCIN, one of the first ES. 
MYCIN was developed at Stanford University to help physicians diagnose illnesses 
[4]. Mostly due to the success of MYCIN, the possibilities of developing ES in many 
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other fields of technology have been or are being explored. Development of ES is one 
of the fields of AI being extensively explored today. 
The most commonly used definition of an ES, "a computer program which mim­
ics human experts," is accurate but imprecise. It overlooks the fact that most human 
experts cannot clearly explain their train of thought in solving some problems. There­
fore, in order to complete the above definition, the ES can precisely be said to be, "a 
computer program based on a well defined body of knowledge related to a specific 
problem area, which mimics human experts." 
The major insight gained from early work in problem-solving was the importance 
of domain-specific knowledge [5]. An engineer, for example, in diagnosing a malfunc­
tion in an auxiliary cooling system of a nuclear power plant, is not successful if she 
solely uses her innate problem-solving skills; she is effective because she employs her 
theoretical and empirical knowledge about the cooling system. In other words, ex­
pert knowledge is a combination of theoretical understanding of the problem with a 
collection of heuristic problem-solving rules that experience has shown to be effective 
in the domain. Thus, ES are constructed by obtaining this knowledge from a human 
expert and coding it into a form that a computer may apply to similar problems. 
Although some ES are developed by the domain experts themselves, it is of­
ten more feasible to do this as a collaborative effort between domain experts and a 
separate AI specialist. The domain experts provide the necessary knowledge of the 
problem domain through a general discussion of their problem-solving methods and 
by demonstrating those skills on a carefully chosen set of sample problems. The AI 
specialists (who are frequently referred to as knowledge engineers) are responsible 
for implementing this knowledge in a program that is both effective and seemingly 
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intelligent in its behavior [5]. 
The knowledge engineer is sometimes aided by ES tools called shells. Shells are 
computer programs, developed for storing the knowledge of the domain experts in 
the form of rules; this allows the domain expert to refine the KB through a process 
of giving it example problems to solve. The KB developed by the domain expert 
can then be queried by the user through the shell. Also, similar to domain experts 
gaining expertise by experience, shells must allow modification of the KB as new 
information is obtained. The processes of storing and refining the KB by the domain 
expert and querying the KB by the user has to be facilitated in a user-friendly 
fashion, since, in developing the shell, it must be assumed that neither the user nor 
the domain expert has the required knowledge in computer programming. Therefore, 
it is easily recognized that the use of a successful shell is restricted to a given domain 
of knowledge. 
The knowledge acquired from domain experts will be organized as a collection 
of rules (rules of thumb or heuristic rules) which allow the ES to draw conclusions 
from given data or premises, and thereby offer intelligent advice or make intelligent 
decisions. The procedure of drawing conclusions from the knowledge is conducted 
by the "inference mechanism" of the ES [6]. In short, be it developed by a domain 
expert or a knowledge engineer, ES are mainly composed of a KB and an inference 
mechanism (or inference engine). The most common type of knowledge used by the 
domain experts can be formalized as heuristic rules [3]. 
In most ES developed for diagnostic problems, it is required that a combination 
of heuristics and algorithms be stored as KB. Algorithms are procedures designed to 
result in the correct solution of problems and are used for solving problems in con­
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ventional programs. For example, the procedure for multiplication is an algorithm. 
By following the same procedure, one would obtain the correct product of any two 
numbers. A comparison of algorithms and heuristic is as follows: algorithms provide 
brute force methods of solving problems which, if followed exactly, will result in the 
correct answer; whereas heuristics are short cuts for solving problems but do not 
always result in the correct solution (sometimes it does not rain on a cloudy day). 
Then, why is there a need for using heuristics? The answer lies in the fact that there 
is not an algorithm for every problem. For example, there is not a systematic way 
of predicting rain which always gives the correct forecast. Also, for some problems, 
the knowledge used (accumulated from experience and theoretical background) is 
so complex that formalizing an algorithm is very difficult, at times impossible, and 
sometimes results in an unacceptably long time for computation. Thus, an ES de­
veloped for diagnostic purposes must allow both for storing algorithms of analytical 
models and for using heuristic rules in the KB. 
The inference engine is used to reach conclusions and to control the reasoning 
process [6]. In simpler words, it is the part of the ES which thinks through the 
knowledge it has acquired. Inference mechanisms are of either a deterministic or 
a probabilistic type. When one deals with a knowledge area where assertions are 
certain, deterministic inference engines are used. On the other hand, probabilistic 
inference engines deal with the type of knowledge for which an assertion is associated 
with an assigned probability. The majority of knowledge areas are probabilistic, but 
for many of these areas, the uncertainty is statistically insignificant, so a deterministic 
inference engine is most commonly used [6]. Probabilistic or deterministic inference 
engines use either forward- or backward-chaining methods. 
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Forward-chaining is the term used to describe the process of working forward 
from the evidence to the conclusions, whereas, backward-chaining is working form 
hypothesis to evidence. The latter starts with an object and requests information 
to confirm or deny it. Thus, it is sometimes called object-driven because the sys­
tem begins with an object and tries to verify it. The distinction between forward 
and backward chaining is logically related to the distinction between mathematical 
proofs by deduction or induction. In most ES developed for diagnostic purposes, the 
backward-chaining inference mechanism is used. 
Finally, the "human window", through which ES interacts with the user, should 
not be overlooked. Most tools for developing ES provide excellent graphics capabili­
ties and window systems. Since ES are competing with the domain experts' human 
interactive capabilities, full exploration of this aspect is crucial. 
Definition of Important Terms 
The terms, DN, FG, and breach types are explained in the following discussion: 
• After the discovery of nuclear fission it was considered that some fission frag­
ments having a large excess of neutrons over stable isotopic nuclei should emit 
prompt neutrons either at the instant of fission or very soon after. However, 
some fission fragments undergo several steps of /3-decay and finally reach a state 
where de-excitation by neutron emission is possible. The fission products which 
undergo /3-emission and their decay daughters that finally reach a stable state 
by neutron emission are respectively called DN precursors. 
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• The gaseous fission products, FG, are insoluble in the fuel matrix, thus they 
tend to form bubbles. The rate at which bubbles are formed is generally very 
high. After birth, bubbles either grow and contribute to fuel swelling or they 
migrate to free surfaces where the gas is released into the volume bounded by 
the cladding [7]. The radioactivity of the FG released to the cover gas (which 
is caused by the breaching of clad) is measured and used for performing the FG 
analysis. 
• The term "clad breach" is a generic term used to indicate fuel clad failure. In 
general the axial forces which cause clad breach in the fuel column are of two 
types [8]: the stress caused by accumulation of FG in fuel and the stress induced 
by swelling of the fuel. By FG analysis, we hope to distinguish between three 
types of breach: creep-rupture, FCMI, and birth defect. The breach of either 
creep-rupture or FCMI type is caused by swelling of the clad and accumulation 
of FG in the fuel. However, in FCMI, the gap between the fuel and clad is closed; 
thus, the fuel and clad interact mechanically and perhaps chemically. On the 
other hand, in creep-rupture, there is still a gap between the fuel and clad when 
breach occurs. Finally, the birth defect is caused by errors in welding. This 
breach is considered benign, since welding is applied only in the upper region 
of fuel elements and fuel elements in EBR-II are partially immersed into the 
sodium pool. Therefore, there is a small probability of sodium/fuel interaction 
in weld breaches. 
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Run Beyond Clad Breach Program 
A program has been underway at EBR-II since 1977 to evaluate the post-
cladding-breach performance of metal and mixed-oxide fuel elements. This activity 
is called the RBCB program. Interest in this program derives from the fact that 
oxide fuel in contact with sodium reacts chemically to form a lower-density reaction 
product. Since it was assumed from an economics basis that fuel elements in LMR 
would have to operate beyond the point of initial breach of cladding, questions arose 
in the areas of reaction kinetics and thermodynamics, event detection, and primary 
system contamination. The RBCB program was designed from its inception to ad­
dress these questions. In 1981 a contract was signed between the U.S. Department of 
Energy and the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan 
for joint support of the RBCB program. Argonne is also undertaking work in RBCB 
testing of IFR metal fuel in EBR-II [9]. 
In 1975 preparations were begun for irradiation of experimental elements in 
EBR-II to beyond the point of initial breach of cladding. This type of irradiation 
evolved rapidly into the present RBCB program. The major problem encountered 
in preparing the facility for such testing was leakage of cover gas up into the reactor 
building. A noble gas, argon, is used as the cover gas above the sodium coolant 
in EBR-II. Thus, leakage of argon cover gas alone is of no concern for operation of 
EBR-II. However, running the reactor with one or more breached elements that were 
releasing fission products to the cover gas would be a major problem. It was found 
possible to make only modest reductions in the leak rate by refurbishment of seals. 
Thus, a CGCS was designed, built, and installed to purify the cover gas by means of 
a cryogenic still working on a liquid nitrogen cycle. This system has proven to be a 
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highly effective means of controlling gaseous fission products in the cover gas [9]. 
Even though the release of high radioactivity to the cover gas was controlled by 
the CGCS, to maintain a safe RBCB program there is a need for effectively identifying 
the breached element and keeping surveillance of it thereafter. To accomplish this, 
three analytical models have been developed, each providing many diagnostic tools. 
However, the complexity of these models has made inference from their results a 
tedious and at times impossible task for the reactor operator. Here, the purpose of 
this research is to design an ES that can be used for diagnosing fuel failures during 
RBCB operation. 
Scope of the Project 
In the design of the ES for identification and surveillance of failed fuel elements, 
the analytical models used by the domain experts as diagnostic tools (i.e., interpreting 
TG and DN) must be incorporated in the KB. In addition to these analytical models, 
FG analysis is also developed and used as a part of the KB of the ES. The analytical 
models and the diagnostic tools used in the ES are the following; 
1. TG analysis: 
• Identifying the subassembly that contains the failed fuel element 
2. DN analysis: 
• Verifying the identification of the location of the breached element 
• Determining the extent of the breached element 
14 
• Indicating the potential for release of fuel to the coolant (by size of the 
breach) 
• Annunciating the possible onset of a subassembly flow-blockage event 
3. FG analysis: 
• Indicating the occurrence of a new breach 
• Indicating the number of failed fuel elements in-core 
• Indicating the type of breach (fuel-column or plenum) 
• Indicating the type of breached element (mixed-oxide or metal) 
• Indicating the mechanism of the breach in a mixed-oxide element (FCMI 
or creep-rupture) 
• Facilitating diagnostics in a multi-breach mode 
These analytical models and the diagnostic tools are described in Chapters 2, 3, and 
4. 
The TG and DN analyses have been used for many years in EBR-II; therefore, a 
considerable amount of expertise has already been acquired from using these methods. 
However, there has been very little experience in FG analysis. To gain expertise in 
FG analysis, data required as input in the FG analytical model were accumulated 
from May of 1986 to April of 1990. The FG analysis was performed and the results 
were studied. 
The results of the five years period were then used for extracting rules that can 
be used as part of the KB of the ES. These rules were generated using the inductive 
learning techniques. The ES shell, 1st Class Fusion, a product of 1st Class Expert 
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System, Inc., was used to derive the rule tree. This shell requires a set of examples, 
with the associated conclusion, as input. Before entering the examples, the important 
diagnostic factors and the associated value for each factor must be declared. Each 
diagnostic event is formalized as an example. In each example, a value for each factor 
and the associated conclusion must be included. 
In these examples, the TG information was obtained from the monthly status 
reports (called "leak reports") produced at EBR-II. The data, including the DN 
signals, the activities of the FG isotopes, and the CGCS purge rates (used as input 
for the FG analysis) were acquired from the data acquisition system (DAS) at EBR-
II. The FG analysis was then performed and the results were plotted and analyzed 
to produce the examples which were needed to produce the rules, using the inductive 
learning technique. In Chapter 5, the analysis of the FG activity for the past five 
years is provided. In Chapter 6, the method of inductive learning and the associated 
rule tree development is described. The rules generated from this past experience 
(inductive learning) are reviewed and analyzed. 
Another facility provided by 1st Class Fusion for generating the rules was then 
used to incorporate the heuristic rules. These are heuristic rules used by the domain 
experts and are not generated by inductive learning. Also, methods are set forth for 
learning from future experience. Specifically, an algorithm is provided which modifies 
the KB of the ES to accommodate for new expertise acquired. This is accomplished 
by introducing meta-rules. The meta-rules are used to decide whether the new event 
is within the domain of the expertise of the KB. In case a new event is encountered, 
the meta-rules would direct the ES to acquire this new expertise, thus, modifying the 
existing rules in the KB. In other words, the meta-rule regenerates the rules by using 
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inductive learning whenever a new event is encountered. 
In Chapter 7, the use of met a-rules and pattern recognition techniques are ex­
plored, since, ultimately, the learning of this expert system must be automated. 
Finally, we conclude by outlining the overall architecture of the ES. 
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CHAPTER 2. TAG GAS METHOD FOR FAILED FUEL 
IDENTIFICATION 
A method developed at the earlier stages of failed fuel diagnostics at EBR-II 
was the TG method. Gas tagging consists of the addition of small amounts of gas 
that has a unique isotopic composition to fuel pins of each assembly. When a fuel 
element fails during subsequent irradiation, the unique composition of TG added to 
the fuel elements allows identification of the subassembly. This is done by a mass 
spectrometric analysis of the reactor cover gas into which the gas from the failed fuel 
is incorporated [10]. The TG method used currently for identification of fuel failure in 
EBR-II is an analytical method involving barycentric coordinates as described later 
here. This method has evolved from other methods when their shortcomings were 
realized. The current TG method and its predecessors are described in this chapter. 
Xenon Tag Method 
The method of xenon tagging entails mixing xenon with varying ratios of different 
stable xenon isotopes with the usual gas filling of fuel elements, so that the tags 
added to the fuel elements are distinguishable. By doing so, the ratio of any two 
stable isotopes then becomes a unique tag identifying a fuel element. The method 
of xenon tagging was first invented by Renault and others [11] at Argonne National 
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Laboratory to be used for diagnostics in EBR-II [10]. , 
The xenon tag is added to fuel elements in two ways. A syringe is filled with 
several ml of tag and one ml is injected into each of several fuel elements by means of 
a long needle reaching to the bottom of the helium-filled gas plenum; or, alternatively, 
the entire element is evacuated and then back-filled with a predetermined mixture 
of helium and tag [11]. In EBR-II, approximately one ml of a unique mixture of the 
stable xenon isotopes, A'e, and A'e are loaded into unirradiated 
elements, using one of the above methods. All of the xenon isotopes are obtained by 
isotopic enrichment of natural xenon, except for Ae which is obtained by thermal 
neutron irradiation of iodine [10]. The volume of TG added to the fuel elements varies 
from 0.5 to 1.5 ml, and volumes of tag available in the cover gas for analysis have also 
var ied  widely  f rom 0.006 to  0 .83 ml.  A lower  l imi t  of  re lease  of  approximately  0 .04 ml 
of tag into the cover gas was cited in Reference [10] as permitting identification. 
Up to 1975, implementation of this method posed no complications, since ex­
pected TG release to the cover gas was not greatly dissimilar to what had been loaded, 
considering that the irradiation time of the xenon isotopes to that point was short. 
However due to (n,7) reactions with the ratio increases as 
fuel burnup becomes significantly large. This was anticipated, but since the burnup 
was low (i.e., < 5 at.%) there was not a need for correcting for changes in the es­
timated amount of tags. In January of 1975, failure of the first highly burned-up 
element was seen, where 20% burnout of had occurred. Also, at this bur­
nup there is a substantial production of The combined result was a 270% 
increase of the ratio Xej^'^^Xe) [10]. To correct for this, empirical correlations 
for buildup of ^^^Xe and burnout of ^^^Xe were developed by So et al. [12]. 
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The empirical correlations now used in EBR-II are [10]: 
For burnout in all elements, 
_ Fi2iVtag 
124 0.018D + 1' 
where 
VJ24 = of 
Vfag = tag volume, ml 
FI24 = fraction of TG that is 
D = total fluence {njcm^ x 10"^^). 
For buildup in mixed-oxide elements 
Vl28 = + 2 13 X 
where 
Vj28 — of  Xe  
Vtag =tag volume, ml 
Fi28 = fraction of TG that is 
H = weight  of  heavy meta l ,  g 
B =burnup,  at .%.  
Correlations have also been developed for exposure changes in the ^^^Xe and ^"^^Xe 
content of xenon tags, although, their changes are of secondary importance, compared 
to those of ^^^Xe and ^^^Xe [13]. 
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Ratio of Fission Gas to Tag Gas for Diagnosis 
A related difficulty arose at higher fuel burnup, as fission-produced xenon became 
more prominent and caused tag compositions that were initially different to become 
similar. This led to ranking of suspects on the basis of their relative fractional releases 
of FG and xenon tag [14]. 
Assuming perfectly mixed FG and TO in plenums of all types of elements, the 
following relations were used to search for the failed fuel element using the relative 
fractional releases of FG and xenon tag [10]: 
XlvJjc 
Vtp Vic  '  
where, 
VyTp = volume of FG in plenum, 
V^p = volume of TG in plenum, 
yfc — volume of FG in cover gas, and, 
= volume of TG in cover gas. 
The value of Vy^ is obtained from gas release correlations [15] for elements irradiated 
in EBR-II, is known from tag records, and and are directly measured by 
radiometric analysis and mass spectrometry of cover-gas samples. This method, of 
course, added an extra degree of confidence for diagnosis. 
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Ratio of to Used for Diagnosis 
To identify the type of failed fuel element, the ratio of stable to stable 
can be measured. This will give an indication of whether a fission product 
release was from a uranium-metal driver-fuel element or an experimental element 
containing plutonium [16]. Lambert and others [10], demonstrated that even though 
the ratio changes with burnup, the tags released from different types 
of intact elements after irradiation in the EBR-II are distinguishable. 
The data analyzed for this method were obtained by studying failed fuel elements 
containing a wide range of fissioning nuclides, namely, from pure 235^/- fissioning in 
the driver-fuel elements to almost pure Pu fissioning in a few mixed-oxide elements 
containing '25wt% Pn02 and in natural UO2 [10]. 
By plotting the ratio of to versus average fuel burnup in at .%,  
Lambert [10] showed that the data fall into three distinct areas: a central band 
that includes measured ratios from almost all fully enriched elements containing 20 
to 25wt% plutonium, an area below this band that contains ratios found only in 
uranium-metal driver-fuel elements, and an area above the band that contains ratios 
from more nearly pure plutonium-fissioning elements. The two lines confining the 
central band are found to be parallel and to have a negative slope, in other words, 
the ratios decrease with increasing burnup, as is expected. 
This method is found to be useful in determining whether or not a release has 
been from a uranium source; thus, it can be used to eliminate many suspect sub­
assemblies. For example, ratios of the metal element type (i.e., driver-fuel element) 
fall in the lower area. When this method was used for the first time in March of 
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1975 at EBR-II, there was a release from an element in an untagged subassembly. 
The use of this method allowed eliminations of many suspects; thus, identifying the 
subassembly where the failed element was located [10]. 
Vector Technique Used for Identification of Simultaneous Tags 
Another problem arose when the occurrence frequency of the breaches increased, 
namely simultaneous tag releases were seen. This happens when a failure occurs 
while more than a negligible amount of TG is present in the coolant from one or 
more previous leakers. During 1975 the occurrence of a simultaneous tag release was 
detected for the first time. Although the amount of the tag from the earlier leaker was 
small, the identification of the new breached element was affected [10]. This led to 
the development of the code MIXTAG by So and Stauffer [17]. This code takes into 
account both the change of the tag during exposure by use of the empirical formulae 
described previously and the secondary effects of natural xenon contamination of the 
argon cover gas and FG from "tramp" uranium [10]. 
In EBR-II, it is found that there is an irreducible trace of fissionable material in 
the core external to the fuel cladding. This material produces fission products at a 
rate equivalent to that which would be expected form the exposure of around 
of 235 The term "tramp" uranium stems from the assumption that this material 
is actually contamination on the surface of the fuel cladding, and the term "tramp" 
activity, analogously, refers to the activity due to the fissioning of the "tramp" ura­
nium and its by-products [18]. In the experiments conducted in EBR-II, during a six 
to seven years period, the level of tramp activity has remained remarkably constant. 
This implies that the tramp uranium can not be incidental contamination; since, if 
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this were the case then the tramp level might reasonably be expected to fluctuate, 
depending on the cleanliness with which the most recent batch of fuel was fabricated 
[18]. However, no other explanations are provided in the literature on what might be 
the source or what mechanism causes the constant release of tramp uranium. 
The vector technique, employed in MIXTAG, is described in Reference [19]. The 
material presented in the remainder of this section is mostly obtained from Gross and 
Passerello [19], unless cited otherwise. Gross and Passerello use a two-dimensional 
tag  ra t io  p lane  for  the  sake of  s impl ic i ty  of  demonstra t ion.  In  th is  p lane ,  the  x  — 
and y—coordinates are different ratios of tag isotopes, and their range covers all mole 
ratios of tag isotopes added to the fuel elements. By doing so, each subassembly is 
represented by a node on this plane and is identified by the mole ratio of the tag 
added. The tag nodes used for this example are plotted on the plane and denoted by 
; -^3) etc., in Figure 2.1. After the first breach occurs, the mole ratio of the 
detected tag defines a point (in our example called Bi) in the figure. The breached 
subassembly is identified by calculating the shortest distance between the point 
and the subassembly tag nodes. The position of the nodes in Figure 2.1 are chosen 
arbitrarily for the purpose of this demonstration. 
In this illustration, the shortest distance from B^ identifies node N^. Suppose 
now a second breach occurs while the tag ratio of the first breach is still being de­
tected. Call the point representing the mole ratio of the second breach ^2. The 
procedure for finding the node representing the subassembly which contains the sec­
ondly breached element is now as follows: 
1. Form — 1 vectors from node (the first leaker) to each of the remaining 
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Figure 2.1: Planar display of six tag nodes and three simultaneous breaches. 
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suspect nodes, where N is the total number of nodes in the system (let us call 
these the suspect vectors). 
2. Draw a vector from node A'4 to 82-
3. Find all the perpendicular distances between B2 and suspect vectors. 
4. The shortest perpendicular distance corresponds to the tag node most likely 
representing the second leaker. 
Following this procedure, is found to be the second leaker in this example. 
This procedure is developed based on the logical, and also experimentally dis­
covered principle that the locus of points representing a mixture of two tags is the 
tie-line connecting the two tag nodes (i.e., in our example and Ni). In other 
words, the distance found in the third step is very close to zero as can be seen in 
Figure 2.1. In this figure, six tag nodes are assumed. The tie-line is displayed by 
a solid line connecting the nodes Ni and In the case where a third immediate 
breach occurs, namely, when the tag released by the previous two breaches are still 
detectable, the procedure for identifying the suspects becomes less precise. The point 
in Figure 2.1 depicts the position of the third breach. Since, the point does 
not lie on or near the {Ni,N^) tie-line, a new element has breached. To find the 
third node corresponding to the assembly which contains the third breach element, 
N — 2 triangles are drawn using the tie-line as the base and the remaining nodes as 
vertices (i.e., N2,N^,N^, and Nq in Figure 2.1). The suspects are then the nodes 
that are the vertices of the triangles containing Bg. This demonstrates the limitation 
of the vector method: Bg is in two triangles. Thus, there are two suspects, and 
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Nq. NO further action can be taken to eliminate one of these suspects by only using 
this analysis in two dimensions. 
The use of a three-dimensional vector technique would diminish the probability 
of having more than one suspect when three simultaneous breaches occur. In three 
dimensions, four tag isotopes define three tag ratios which are used as the coordinates. 
The three-dimensional space now can be used for the tag nodes so that the triangles 
formed are not coplanar. For instance, in our example, the position of nodes iVg 
and Nq can be chosen so that the two triangles whose vertices are and Nq 
are not coplanar. The diagnosis can then be easily performed by calculating the 
perpendicular distance between and the triangles whose vertices are the suspects. 
The triangle corresponding to the shortest distance contains the third breach as one 
of its vertices. 
Also, the three-dimensional vector technique allows for identifying the fourth 
breach analogous to finding the third breach in two-dimensional analysis. In this 
case, iV — 3 tetrahedrons are formed by using the first three tag nodes as the common 
base and each of the remaining tag nodes in the system as the fourth vertex. 
Again, by use of vector techniques, diagnosis is performed by determining which 
suspect tetrahedrons enclose the fourth measured node, ^4. And similar to the two-
dimensional analysis, where for the identification of the third breach nondeterminism 
can arise, for three-dimensional analysis identifying the fourth breach can become 
imprecise. Similarly, a four-dimensional vector technique based on five tagging iso­
topes permits precise identification of up to five simultaneous breaches. It must also 
be noted that the background tag detected can be accounted for by representing 
their ratios as nodes. MIXTAG had been successfully used in EBR-II to identify new 
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leakers in the presence of up to two background tags in a core of 50 to 55 tagged as­
semblies [17]. However, due to two limitations this method can not be used in larger 
cores, such as light water reactors or large fast reactors, or in reactors operating in 
the RBCB mode. The first limitation is that, in order to identify the new leaker, the 
previous leakers must have already been identified; and in EBR-II the tag sample 
can be analyzed no more frequently than every two hours [20]. In the case when two 
breaches have occurred within a two-hour period, performing this analysis is mislead­
ing. The second limitation is that the number of operations needed to perform the 
vector technique becomes very large. 
To eliminate the first limitation, a combination of suspect nodes can be assumed 
(e.g. node Ni is the first leaker and the remaining nodes are the other leakers or no 
leakers); by performing the vector analysis the suspect combinations are eliminated 
and the leakers are found. This procedure was followed in the Fast Flux Test Facility 
by Omberg and Schenter [21]. Even though this procedure alleviates the first limita­
tion, it increases the number of operations factorially, and thus enhances the second 
limitation. 
For identifying a leaker among the 50 tag nodes in EBR-II, 10 to 15 seconds 
of computer time is required on the IBM-370/195, depending on whether the leaker 
is the first, second, third, or the fourth leaker of a leaker set. However, if four 
simultaneous breaches occur and none of them were previously identified, 2.3 x 10^ 
tetrahedron calculations are required. This translates to requirement of > 10 hours 
of central processing unit time per run on an IBM-370/195. In general, the number 
of operations increases with the binomial coefficient N\/{N — NJ^)\NJ^\ where N is 
the number of tags and iV^ is the number of leakers. 
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Barycentric-Coordinate Technique 
The barycentric-coordinate technique was developed to overcome the limitations 
previously described. This technique employs an efficient algebraic procedure that 
gives essentially the same result as obtained by the vector technique, but in a frac­
tion of the computing time. This technique, developed by Gross and Passerello, is 
currently in use in EBR-II. The reference for the material presented in this section 
is Gross and Passerello [19]; to be efficient, the citations for this reference will not 
be repeated in the remainder of this section. If the reader desires a more elaborate 
description of the barycentric-coordinate technique, he/she can refer to Gross and 
Passerello. In short, 
"this technique utilizes procedures from finite element mathematics to ex­
press the tag-node coordinate in the form of linear weight functions using 
a system of what are known in topology as barycentric coordinates" [19]. 
Description of the Technique in Two Dimensions 
For the sake of simplifying this demonstration, a two-dimensional tag system 
with three tag nodes is used. The node triangle shown in Figure 2.2, will be used 
to define a barycentric-coordinate system. Three weight functions (c]^,c2, and eg) 
must be defined to describe the coordinates of any point B that falls on the Cartesian 
plane. Let us assume the point B is at {x,y) in the Cartesian coordinates. We can 
relate this position linearly to the new coordinates by the following equations: 
X = cixi + eg «2 + cgzg 
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y  = CIVI  + C23/2 +  C32/3 
By imposing the condition, 
the matrix 
CI + C2 + C3 = 1, 
\ 
XI ^2 ®3 
yi  2/2 f3 
1 1 1 
Co = 
/ 
/ \ 
X 
y  
\ ^ / 
where 
Co = (=2 
\ C3 y 
can be formed. 
The normalization of the weights is desirable, since now the value of cj is unity 
and the others zero at the point (xj^,yj). The matrix equation developed can now be 
solved to obtain the values of the vector C3. In Table 2.1, the physical and geometric 
interpretations of all of the possible values that the elements of the vector C3 can 
have are given. 
The diagnosis using this technique, where there are more than three tag nodes 
and multiple simultaneous breaches, can easily be accomplished. Assuming there are 
N nodes for each leaker then there will be Nl/{N — 3)!3! triangles to be analyzed. 
The vector C3 can then be calculated for all of these triangles. 
By inspection, the C3 vectors which have an element(s) with a negative value 
can be eliminated, since analysis of these would result in nondeterminism; see Table 
30 
R2 
No 
(®2'2/2) 
^1 
Figure 2.2: Transformation from Cartesian coordinates to barycentric-coordinates 
system. 
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Table 2.1: Geometric and physical properties of C'3 solution vector 
Outcome of C3 
Determination 
Physical 
Interpretation 
Geometric 
Interpretation 
Cl = 1 
Cj = 0 
Cfc = 0 
Assembly i leaking Measured node coincides 
wi th  tag  node i  
Cl  = 0 
and 0 < Cj < 1 
and 0 < Cj^ < 1 
Assemblies j  and k  leaking 
simultaneously 
Measured node falls on 
connect ing nodes  j  and k  
0 < c j < 1 
and 0 < cj < 1 
and 0 < c;;. < 1 
Assemblies i, j, and k  leaking 
simultaneously 
Measured node confined 
to triangle whose sides 
connect  nodes  i ,  j ,  and k  
q < 0 
or Cj < 0 
or cj. < 0 
Assemblies i, j ,  and/or k  could 
be leaking, but at least one other 
assembly must be leaking elsewhere 
Measured node lies outside 
triangle whose side nodes 
i ,  j ,  and k  
2.1. After eliminating all C'3 vectors with at least one negative element for each 
breach node, a list of suspect triangles can be formed. The common suspect triangle 
or triangles to all lists contain the nodes corresponding to subassemblies where the 
breach has occurred. Finally, by considering where the detected breach node lies, the 
leaking subassembly or subassemblies are found. In other word, the analysis reduces 
to analysis of only one triangle and the properties of Table 2.1 can be used. 
The analytical technique described above, even though theoretically always valid, 
would not be successful if some practical precautions were not taken. Error induced 
by the analytical technique is due to the experimental uncertainties associated with, 
(a) the resolution of the mass spectrometer detection equipment used to measure the 
isotopic ratios, (b) the blending of the gases when the tags are first created, and (c) 
depending on the gases used, uncertainties in the noble gas isotopic compositions 
due to neutronics effects. Therefore, the multiple failure analysis technique, telling 
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us whether the measured node falls on the line or not, is not sufficient; it must also 
be capable of deteirmining how far from the line the point lies. This would also be 
crucial when one must decide whether or not the point lies in a triangle (refer to 
Table 2.1). 
This shortcoming can be remedied by enforcing a cylindrical and a spherical 
uncertainty space respectively around the lines that connect two tag nodes and the 
nodes themselves. The dimensions of these cylinders and spheres are determined by 
the uncertainties of the measuring equipment. Also, realizing that the components of 
the matrix C3 have a direct geometric interpretation, a visual understanding of the 
position of the breach nodes relative to the tag nodes barycentric coordinates can be 
achieved: for a triangle whose vertices are tag nodes i, j, and k, the value of | | is 
equal to {ABjkf^ijk) and when B lies in the triangle is positive and when it lies 
outside of ijk it is negative. 
The Barycentric Technique in N Dimensions 
When new breach tags are detected very soon after the collection of others, elim­
ination of all possible modes of failure (i.e., triangles in a two-dimensional analysis) 
may become impossible. This is because the breach nodes on a two-dimensional 
plane would lie near each other, thus causing an increase in the number of common 
mode failures. When this occurs in practice, the breach tag detection may have to 
be repeated until a unique identification is obtained. "Thus, for a reactor with a 
two-dimensional system in which many nodes lie on a common plane, an automatic 
on-line mass spectrometer with a cycling time shorter than the effective mean cleanup 
time for noble gases in the primary system would be essential" [19]. 
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However, with less effort, use of a higher-dimensional tag system would alleviate 
this problem, since the probabilities of coplanarity of triangles become much lower. 
Therefore, identification of the leakers can be accomplished with only one sample, 
even though detection of consecutive tag samples would add confidence to the results 
of the initial analysis or detect shifts that might indicate the occurrence of new 
releases. 
The barycentric technique is easily extended from a two-dimensional plane to an 
N-dimensional hyperspace. The resulting matrix equation is in the form: 
/ 
«1,1 «1,2 
«2,1 «2,2 
«#,1 «iV,2 
V 1 1 
H,N+1 
^2,N+1 
^N,N+1 
1 
\ 
'N+l  -
( ai \ 
«2 
aN 
\ 1 / 
where 
'N+1 
CI 
C2 
\ '^iV+l 
The element a^ j is the location of the tag node j ,  in dimension. 
Gross outlines the diagnosis as follows. In general, if J of the N + 1 assemblies 
are leaking, the J corresponding components of CjV-j-i will be between 0 and 1, and 
the remaining components will be zero. Moreover, for components that are nonzeros, 
Cj  uniquely  def ines  the  f rac t ion of  TG that  has  escaped f rom assembly i .  
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Finally, if the measured node falls outside the hyperpolyhedron whose vertices 
are the N + I tag nodes, one or more of the c's will be negative. In this case it 
means that at least one assembly other than, or possibly in addition to, the N + I 
suspects must be releasing TG somewhere else in the system. Gross concludes by 
emphasizing the importance of accuracy in specification of assembly tag compositions 
and treatment of background-tag isotopes. 
Evaluation of TG Analysis 
Currently, the barycentric coordinate technique in three dimensions is used at 
EBR-II [20]. This analytical method has proven to be successful; however, there are 
still some practical disadvantages [20]: 
1. TG mass spectrometry is not automated. 
2. The maximum frequency of TG analysis is once every two hours. 
3. When a breach occurs, sometimes the TG is not released due to the blockage 
caused by fuel-sodium reaction product at the site of the defect. 
4. The recently incorporated CGCS, reduces the amount of FG in the cover gas 
but also it reduces the amount of TG; thus, it makes the mass spectrometry 
more difficult. 
5. The cost of having a unique tag for each subassembly is very high specially for 
reactors with large cores. 
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6. TG might be released from the breached element gradually during a long period 
of time. 
Added to these practical disadvantages, when multiple simultaneous breaches occur 
(and none of them has been identified previously), even with all efforts made to 
improve the time efficiency of the analytical method, the computer time needed for 
diagnosis is too long. 
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CHAPTER 3. USE OF DELAYED NEUTRON SIGNALS FOR 
SELECTION AND SURVEILLANCE OF FAILED FUEL ELEMENTS 
IN FAST REACTORS 
Until 1978, the occurrences of fuel failure in EBR-II were well separated, due 
to the low burnup of fuel elements. Also, a great deal of gas release, i.e., tag and 
FG, was detected when a clad breach occurred. This facilitated identification of 
breached elements by solely using the xenon-tag analysis. However, problems arose 
when higher burnup of fuel elements was reached, as was mentioned in the previous 
chapter. After 1978, when clad breach of highly burned-up advanced fuel elements 
such as carbide or nitride elements occurred, very little FG and TG release was seen 
but significant DN signals were produced [22]. Also, for the RBCB operation, not 
only the location but also the extent of the breach must be determined. This led to 
the development of a new technique, namely, DN signal analysis. 
The DN signal analysis technique, as developed, complements the TG analysis 
by providing tools: verifying the location of the breach by inspecting the transit time 
(the traveling time of DN precursors from failed fuel to the DN detectors) so that 
an estimated distance to the location of the breached element can be identified, and 
determining the extent of the breach by providing an estimate of the actual area of 
fuel beneath the cladding defect. In this chapter, the DN detection system used for 
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measuring the activity due to the emission of DN is described and the development 
of the analytical rtiodel used for determining the surface area of the defected site is 
outlined. The analytical model is comprised of the equation used for calculating the 
activity due to the emission of DN and the statistical model. The statistical model 
facilitates the diagnostic tools mentioned above. 
Delayed Neutron Detection System 
A design schematic of the triple-station DN characterization system, or 3-DND 
system, obtained from Reference [23], is depicted in Figure 3.1. The 3-DND will 
ultimately be used in the place of the currently used apparatus called fuel-element 
rupture detector (FERD) system for DN signal detection in EBR-II. The 3-DND 
system consists of three DNDs, a general isotope release analysis for failed element 
(GIRAFFE) micro-processor, and the output displays of GIRAFFE. The FERD sys­
tem is also comprised of GIRAFFE and the output displays of GIRAFFE; however, 
in the FERD system only one DND is used. The new design for the DN detection 
system was needed for the reasons to be explained. However, the development of the 
analytical model and its deficiencies must be explained first. 
A sodium sample is taken from the intermediate heat exchanger outlet to the 
3-DND detectors located external to the reactor vessel. The count rate from DN 
emission by the precursors in a unit volume of sodium coolant seen by the detectors 
is measured. The sodium coolant sample is then returned to the primary loop. Signals 
from the DN detectors are analyzed by GIRAFFE. The analytical method used for 
developing GIRAFFE is described in the next section. This analytical method was 
developed and validated using data obtained from RBCB tests in EBR-II [22]. 
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Figure 3.1: DND configuration for on-line characterization of DN signals 
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As is shown in Figure 3.1, the DN precursors reach the first DND after + 
Tij, + tj: time, where is the isotopic holdup time in the fuel pin after birth, Tfj, 
is the transit time in the primary coolant, and (yis the time spent in the 3-DND 
or the FERD loop before detection. An experiment, using fission product source 
(FPS) capsules, was performed and the results were reported by Gross and Policy 
[24]. The objectives were to evaluate the response characteristics of DNDs at EBR-II 
under a broad range of transient power and transient temperature conditions, and to 
verify that FPS capsules are "pure recoil sources"; that is, the fission product release 
rate is directly proportional to the product of the fission rate and surface area under 
both steady-state and transient temperature conditions. The purpose of the second 
objective was to use FPS capsules, verified to be "pure recoil" sources, to calculate 
the values of and T^j.. An accurate determination of these parameters is crucial in 
setting up a fission product monitoring system for EBR-II and other reactors. This 
is described in detail, in Section 4.2.3. 
After performing the experiments, Gross and Policy concluded that (a) DNDs in 
EBR-II are very sensitive and have excellent counting statistics; (b) they are highly 
linear with respect to power variations and are unaffected by variations in DND 
temperature; and (c) they can accurately follow transient release rate variations over 
a broad frequency range. 
Analytical Method Used in GIRAFFE 
The DN precursors are released from the fuel elements through many mecha­
nisms. In the development of the earlier models used for DN analysis, it was assumed 
that the recoil emission is the only way the DN precursors and their parent isotopes 
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escape from the breached fuel pins. Because of this assumption, the original models 
were not successful when used for diagnosing the failure of certain types of fuel ele­
ments. For example, it was found that DN signals produced by oxide fuel elements 
were often several times larger than the values calculated by the methods developed 
based on the assumption that the release of DN emitters is only by recoil from the 
geometrical area of the fuel exposed to the coolant [22]. 
The new model, which is used to develop GIRAFFE, treats nonrecoil fission 
sources as well as recoil sources. Also, other considerations are employed so that 
this new model can be applied to general cases. Namely, the following factors were 
taken into account: (a) the intermediate decay of the precursors of DN emitters in 
the fuel and the coolant; (b) the enhancement of the total DN signal from nonrecoil 
effects; (c) the isotopic holdup in the fuel and the effect of this holdup on the relative 
proportions of short- versus long-lived isotopes; and (d) the compound decay of tramp 
DN emitters within the FERD loop. The material for this description is obtained 
from Gross and Strain [22]. 
Derivation of the Equation Used for Calculating DN Activity 
The first step for developing the analytical equation which is used to calculate the 
total activity of DN emitters at the FERD detectors is to form differential equations 
for calculating the number of parent and daughter isotopes in the fuel matrix. These 
differential equations are then modified so that the release time for DN precursors and 
their parent isotopes from the fuel matrix can be also taken into account. The release 
from the fuel matrix is assumed to be governed by an Arrhenius rate equation as a 
function of time; thus, the parameter Ae, which is defined as the effective escape-rate 
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coefficient is introduced. This parameter is the reciprocal of the previously defined 
Th (i-e., Ae = 1/Tfe). 
The modified differential equations are then solved for equilibrium condition 
(i.e., at times longer than l/(Ae + ^ decay))- Without any doubt, it can be assumed 
that parent and daughter isotopes have reached equilibrium before they are released 
from the fuel matrix, since the time that fuel elements spend in the reactor before 
clad breach occurs is always orders of magnitude longer than the time governing the 
equilibrium condition. Therefore, by assuming steady state, or mathematically by 
setting dNIdt equal to zero, where dN is the change in the number of isotopes in the 
differential time dt, the time-independent equations which give the number of parent 
and daughter isotopes from birth to when they are released from the fuel matrix, are 
found to be, 
and 
N DF -  ^  (A^ 4- Ae) 
where 
= number of atoms of parent isotope i in fuel at steady state 
p = number of atoms of daughter isotope i in fuel at steady state 
S 'p ,  5^  = fiss ion product ion ra tes  for  i sotopes  of  species  i ,  atomsf  s  
Ap,A^ = decay constants for isotopes of species i, 
The second step entails calculating the concentration of parent and daughter 
isotopes initially at the defect site in the sodium coolant. To find the number of 
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isotopes in the sodium coolant, it is convenient to work on a unit volume basis. 
This assumption is made that even though the isotopes initially injected into 
the coolant do not remain together for the entire trip, the principal effects in EBR-II 
are thought to be large-eddy mixing in the upper plenum and flow stream splitting 
and recombining. However, one must also realize that while these effects can create 
significant dispersion in the measured signals, mean values obtained by averaging 
large numbers of data should follow the behavior governed by the equations developed 
based on the assumptions made earlier. 
If Np and iVp are, respectively, defined as the initial concentration of 
parent and daughter isotopes at the defect site in atom jew? of sodium that are 
released into the differential volume of coolant flowing past the defect site, then the 
equations for the parent and daughter concentrations are: 
and 
^ 
where, F = primary coolant flow rate in crrfi js. 
In the third step, the equations used for calculating the activity of the daughter 
isotope i at the FERD detector are derived. The number of atoms of parent isotope 
i released into the coolant at the time t can be calculated by, 
V 4.._, u 
the governing differential equation used for population of the daughter isotope i  is. 
J t  ~ ^P ,Na^P -  ^D^D,Na^  
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and the initial condition (i.e., at ( = 0) for the number of daughter isotopes is. 
At this point it is appropriate to separate the total flow-delay time t  into two com­
ponents by making the substitution, t = T^j. + (y, for the reasons which will become 
apparent later on. 
The governing differential equation for the daughter isotope can be solved nu­
merically by applying the initial condition and using the time dependent equation 
for the parent isotope. The resulting equations give the number of atoms of isotope 
i as a function of and Ag. To find the activity from the concentration of the 
daughter isotope, the following relation is used, 
Thus, the equation for finding the activity of the daughter isotope i is determined to 
be 
if) - -Jjr- x -"j + 
e  
X (ezp(-A^(% + (/))) • 
(3.1) 
The final step of this effort is then to derive the equation for finding the total 
DN activity at the detector in cpsjctrfi of sodium. This is accomplished by using the 
relation, 
9 
^ A{Ttr , t j : ,Xe fPn^ ,  
i=l 
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where Pn^ is the probability of neutron emission for isotope i .  
Background Count Considerations 
The activity of the DN emitters calculated above must be corrected for DN 
emitters produced by the fissioning of tramp uranium. The equation for calculating 
the tramp emitted DN signal as a function of flow rate of sodium coolant within the 
FERD loop is derived making the following assumptions. 
1. The tramp uranium acts like a recoil source, ejecting both parent and daughter 
isotopes with zero holdup. 
2. The location of the tramp source is in the reactor core. 
3. Decay equations for the tramp produced parent and daughter DN emitters 
behave in the same manner as those released from the fuel defect. 
The procedure for deriving the equation for the activity of the tramp produced 
DN emitters is then analogous to the one explained in the previous section, except 
that, due to the first assumption made, there is no need to include an effective escape-
rate coefficient Ag. 
An experiment was performed and results were reported in Gross and Strain 
[22] to validate the method used for calculating activity due to the tramp produced 
DN emitters. Decay equations were applied for the DN emitters and their parents 
traveling from the core to the FERD inlet using a transit time of 15.0s and zero 
holdup time. The activities of the tramp DN emitters were then calculated for various 
FERD flow rates. To check the calculated values, the DN activity was measured while 
knowing that there were no breached elements present in the core (to be certain that 
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there are no nonrecoil sources present in-core). After superimposing the measured 
and calculated values on a plot of tramp background signal versus FERD flow, it was 
found that the agreement between the experimentally observed and predicted tramp 
signals was very good, which served to justify the earlier assumptions. 
Statistical Method Used for Determining Transit and Holdup Time 
It was stated in Section 3.2.1 that the activity of the DN emitters at the FERD 
detectors is dependent on three variables: the transit time from the core to the 
FERD-loop inlet, (or \e) the parameter used to account for the time the DN 
emitters spend in the fuel, and t j the flow delay time within the FERD-loop, which 
is directly dependent on the controlled parameter, FERD-loop flow rate. To use the 
analytical equation developed, one must determine Ag and T^j,, since the parameter 
Éyisa controlled parameter and its value is decided by the FERD-loop flow rate 
setting. An optimization algorithm was developed that minimizes a nonlinear error 
function to determine these parameters. It is of the form: 
J  2  
k=l  
where 
k  = the number of flow steps, 
Amk — measured DN activity, corrected for the tramp background, 
Apj^ = predicated activity, 
Wf^ = weight function assigned to Apf^, 
J  = total number of FERD flow steps. 
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To calculate Tf-j, (when there is no breached element present in EBR-II), a known 
purely recoil fission-product source is used to obtain the measured value of the DN 
activity (i.e., at different FERD loop flow rates. The values of are cal­
culated by using the analytical equation. At this point the optimization algorithm 
is used to calculate Ti^, since for a purely recoil source Ag = oo. The values found 
for Tij, are then used to determine the value of Ag in experiments where the source 
of the DN signal is not known. An accurate determination of is crucial, since 
tests have shown that its value depends on the relative core location of the defective 
element. 
Determination of the Surface Area of the Defect Site 
A statistical model is developed for determining the actual surface area of the 
defect in a breached fuel element. Also with this model, other useful information 
relating to the overall efficiency of the DN detection system and the background due 
to gamma decay can also be obtained. Figure 3.2 is presented for illustrating this 
statistical model. In this figure, the values for .4^^ and at different FERD-loop 
flow rates, obtained from techniques described in the previous section, are plotted on 
a measured versus predicted activity plot. Then a best-fit regression line is drawn. 
Characteristics of this line, and the success of the regression method used in fitting 
the data points, are the diagnostic tools made available to accomplish the tasks 
mentioned above. 
The value of the point 7 (i.e., the point where the best-fit line intercepts the 
Y-axis) is an important piece of information. The numerical value of this point has 
a pertinent physical meaning, which is as a measure of the photoneutron component 
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Y 
X = Predicted DN activity 
Y = Measured DN activity 
Figure 3.2: Plot of five pairs of measured and predicted DN activities and the best-fit 
line. 
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due to the gamma activity in the coolant, primarily from the decay of ^^iVa. Prior 
to this realization, the gamma background signal had to be directly measured. Now, 
by merely extrapolating the best-fit line, the value of the gamma background signal 
can easily be obtained. 
As is demonstrated in Figure .3.2, there are some vertical deviations of data 
plotted from the best-fit line. Of course, in the case where the activity measurement 
equipment and the analytical model for predicting the activity are perfect, it is ex­
pected that the plotted data will fall exactly on the best-fit line; in other words, the 
values of vertical deviations (called the residuals in counts/s) are zero. However, in 
reality, this is not the case. Nevertheless, the calculated residuals can be used to learn 
more about the deficiency of both the analytical model and the radiation detection 
equipment. For example, by studying the residuals, over- or under-predicting at low 
FERD-loop flow rates can be determined, thus, pinpointing the local deficiency of 
the analytical model. On the other hand, a spurious drift in the counting system 
characteristics or a slightly changing source strength (i.e., FPS) can be spotted; thus, 
anomalies in the detection systems can be found. 
The final and most useful characteristic of the best-fit line is the slope, since it 
is used for calculating the surface area of the defect. This dimensionless parameter, 
which we denote as (7, can theoretically be written as: 
F ' 
where 
VjYa ~ volume of sodium in that is seen by the DN detectors 
a = fission rate in the source, in of fissionable material O Ay 
e = efficiency of the detector arrangement (dimensionless) 
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p = density of the fuel in glcrv? 
V = volume of fuel from which recoil fission products are emitted in crn^ 
F = flow rate of primary sodium in cvnfi js. 
By use of the regression method, a relatively accurate measurement of C can be 
obtained. Of course, the accuracy depends on the number of data points available, but 
Gross and Strain claim that [ctq/C < 6%) can generally be achieved. This equation 
can be manipulated so that the volume of fuel from which recoil fission products 
are emitted can be computed. For this, it is necessary that the other parameters be 
known with a relatively high accuracy. However, due to the geometric complexity 
of the detection system, it is very difficult to calculate the efficiency of the detector 
arrangement in the FERD system. To alleviate this problem, the C computed from 
a test where FPS is the only source of DN emitters in the core is used to compare 
with the C computed during RBCB operation. 
Let us first develop the method set forth and then justify the use of it. By 
selecting the flow rate of coolant in the FERD loop and keeping the geometry of the 
detection system the same in the FPS test and during RBCB operation, it is apparent 
tha t  in  compar ing  the  va lues  o f  Cppg  and  the  pa ramete r s  and  F 
can be dropped. Also, by altering the scaling of the x-axis in Figure 3.2, the value of 
Cppg can be set equal to one. This is done, by adjusting the values of Apj^ which in 
turn is adjusted by altering the values oi Sp) and Sp (i.e., as previously defined, the 
fission production rates of parent and daughter isotopes). These production rates are 
proportional to the fission rate. The physical interpretation of the proportionality 
constant is the probability of birth of parent and daughter isotopes when fission occurs 
( i . e . ,  de r ived  f rom nuc lea r  decay  da ta ) .  In  shor t ,  i n  o rde r  t o  se t  t he  va lue  o f  Cppg  
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to one, the proportionality constant is adjusted. The values of the proportionality 
constant, which resulted in Cppg = 1, are then used for calculating Sj^ and Sp 
when CQ is being determined. Also, it must be noted that this proportionality 
constant must be calculated for each fuel type, since its value depends on the fuel 
material. 
Therefore, the following relation stands, 
r. °'RBGB X PRBCB ^ ^RBCB 
-  a fpsxpppsxVpps  ' 
where 
a = total fission rate in the fuel ( ), 
p  = density of fissionable material (g jcm^)  and, 
V = equivalent recoil volume (cm^). 
In deriving this relation, Cppg is normalized to unity and the parameters, 
and F,  chosen for the FPS test, are equal to the ones used for RBCB operation. As 
can be seen, this new relation is independent of the efficiency of the detection system, 
e. 
To justify the use of data obtained from FPS tests, it must be noted that the 
FPS has been used in many calibration tests with the FERD; thus, a large body of 
base data has been accumulated. However, the most important feature of FPS test 
results is that the total surface area of the fuel material is known. 
To be able to find the exposed surface area rather than the recoil volume, the 
value V is set to be equal to Src x PK, where, W is the experimentally determined 
recoil distance in the source material, and Src is defined as the "equivalent recoil 
area". It should be pointed out, however, that only in the case of a recoil emitter does 
Src represent an actual physical area. For nonrecoil sources (i.e., failed fuel elements 
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while in RBCB operation) Src provides a measure of the square centimeters of the 
source material that would produce a given FERD response if direct recoil were the 
only mechanism for release. Since it is well known that both recoil and nonrecoil 
mechanisms exist, this model can be extended to find the actual physical area in all 
cases. The equation for finding the Src is: 
Evaluation of GIRAFFE 
During RBCB operation, it is crucial to determine the progress of the breach in a 
failed fuel element, since there is a regulatory and safety concern about the possibility 
of a flow-blockage being formed in the cooling system if the breached element is 
allowed to remain in the core for too long a period of time. From experience in 
EBR-II, it is found that the leaker diagnosis by only TG analysis is not sufficient, 
especially when operation continues well past the point of the initial breach. Even 
when enough TG and FG data are available, no correlation can be made with breach 
size. Therefore, the only means of finding the extent of the breach has been placed 
on DN signal analysis. 
The analytical techniques, explained in this chapter, have been incorporated into 
the FORTRAN computer code GIRAFFE. Results obtained from using GIRAFFE 
as a diagnostic tool are reported in Gross and Strain [22]. The conclusions reached 
by Gross and Strain from the experimental results are reported in the remainder of 
the chapter. 
GIRAFFE has been used to determine the value of the transit time (i.e., T^j.) 
and the results have indicated that there is a dependence between the computed 
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value of Tj-^ and the relative core location of the DN source. The quantities of 
calculated by GIRAFFE, were found to be affected by the form (i.e., geometry and 
composition) of the fuel exposed to the coolant as well as the condition of the breach 
site. Also, GIRAFFE was successfully used for determining the signal attributable 
to gamma activity in the coolant. 
As was stated previously, the most important task of GIRAFFE is determination 
of the defect site surface area. Determining this surface area by only measuring the 
magnitude of the DN signal can result in an enormous error, since by doing so it 
is assumed that the only mechanism by which DN emitter are released is recoil. 
Exposed fuel tests performed with known defect sizes indicate that the DN signal 
produced may exceed the signal expected from direct recoil by as much as a factor 
of 234 [22]. 
We will conclude by reflecting the limitations of using GIRAFFE stated by Gross 
and Strain [22]. In developing this model, it is assumed that only one source, in ad­
dition to tramp and gamma background, is in the core, so if two sources are present 
with significantly different transit times and/or isotopic hold times this model does 
not produce an accurate estimate of either parameter. However, from the statistical 
information made available by GIRAFFE (i.e., by inspecting the residuals calculated 
from plotting the measured versus predicted activity and drawing the best-fit regres­
sion line), the presence of more than one leaker can be indicated. When tag signals 
are not well-characterized, this becomes the only means of determining the number 
of leakers in the core. 
The Arrhenius behavior assumed for modeling the nonrecoil mechanism was 
derived empirically. Further research is needed to better understand the interplay of 
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the complex physical mechanisms that are responsible for transport of fission products 
and their progeny from the fuel matrix to the coolant under the various conditions 
that attend sustained operation with exposed fuel in a fast reactor [22]. 
The techniques developed here, both experimental and analytical, are limited to 
steady-state analyses. GIRAFFE does not account for the time dependency of the 
source term which is needed when a power change or an abrupt change in defect size 
occurs. To this effect, the currently used FERD system will be replaced by 3-DND. 
In Figure 3.1, it is shown that three detectors are connected in series and displaced 
in time along the sample stream flow path, thus producing a time delay of ~ 5% of 
the total transit time to the first detector. This delay time is sufficient to provide 
DN decay rate (and hence age) information that can be processed in parallel with 
gross detector count rates [25]. In the near future (January of 1991), the 3-DND 
system is scheduled to be calibrated. Thus, for this project, only the diagnostic tools 
(i.e., existence of a DN emitter, the magnitude of the DN signal, and surface-area 
diagnostics during steady state DN conditions) provided by the FERD system are 
available. 
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CHAPTER 4. DESCRIPTION OF FISSION GAS ANALYSIS 
So far, the diagnostic tools provided by the TG and DN signal analyses for 
identification and surveillance of failed fuel elements have been described. Added 
to these analyses, measured FG activity has been employed for enhancing the tools 
already available and to provide new ones. 
The FG originates in the fuel pins. The primary cover gas is contaminated with 
fission product gases (i.e., Xe- and Kr-isotopes), since major fuel element failures 
(cracks, ruptures) cause fission product gases to penetrate through the sodium into 
the cover gas as bubbles. 
Up to the 1980s, it had been common practice to use the measured activity of 
FG in the cover gas for annunciating fuel failure and only very qualitative information 
about the type of breached fuel involved (oxide or metal) and its burnup (high or 
low) had been successfully extracted from gas release characteristics [18]. 
An analytical model has been developed which uses the measured activity of 
different FG in the cover gas. It provides not only the annunciation of fuel failure 
but also other diagnostic tools which can be employed for [26]: 
1. estimation of the number of failed pins in the core, 
2. differentiation of fuel-column failures from upper-weld failures. 
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3. indication of the severity or character of a breach, 
4. anticipation of DN signal increase, and 
5. acquisition of information on the possible breach mechanism. 
In this chapter, the FG detection system in EBR-II, the analytical model de­
veloped which facilitates the diagnostic tools stated above, and determination of the 
degassing and the cover gas loss rate constants are described. The degassing and 
cover gas leakage rate constants are used in the analytical model for taking into ac­
count, respectively, the holdup time (defined as the confinement time that the FG 
spends in the sodium coolant before it is released into the cover gas) and the loss 
of cover gas from the containment. An accurate measurement of these constants 
is pertinent for successfully implementing the FG analysis. Finally, this chapter is 
concluded by evaluating the use of FG analysis as a diagnostic tool during RBCB 
operation. 
Fission Gas Detection System 
The brief description of the Germanium Lithium Argon Scanning System ( GLASS) 
which has been used for monitoring the activity due to FG in the argon cover gas at 
EBR-II since 1972 is obtained from Brunson [18]. 
The high-resolution lithium-drifted germanium detector is connected to a gas 
sample chamber of ~ 25 ml volume through which the gas sample stream flows. The 
detector and sample chamber are shielded by lead. Other equipments positioned 
above the lead shield, are the high-voltage bias supply for the detector and a linear 
pulse amplifier. GLASS also has a multichannel analyzer and microcomputer located 
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away from the core. A 250 f t  long cable is required for connecting the detection and 
the signal processing systems; as a result, a considerable amount of electrical noise 
is introduced. However, the resolution of the system has been < AkeV as compared 
to 2.SkeV under optimum conditions, for the 1.332MeV line of a source. 
When considerable fission product release has occurred, the cover gas activity 
increases by 3 or 4 orders of magnitude; therefore, in designing GLASS, it was rec­
ognized that the system must have a wide dynamic range to yield good data. This 
is done by decreasing the sensitivity of the system when the activity becomes large. 
The sensitivity is reduced in two steps: the effective volume of the sample chamber 
is decreased, and the sample gas is diluted. The spectral information is collected in a 
2048-channel section of the analyzer memory on a 30 minutes cycle. The microcom­
puter is used for estimating the net count rate for each of several specific isotopes by 
merely subtracting from the summed counts under a peak, the summed counts from 
an equal segment of a representative Compton background at an energy just above 
the peak [27]. The microcomputer transmits the corrected data to the DAS, which 
handles essentially all plant data for EBR-II. 
Similar to DNDs, it is difficult to convincingly calculate the geometric efficiency 
of the GLASS detector, since the detection arrangement is dictated so that a large 
source volume must be placed near a detector of a similar volume. Hence, the ab­
solute concentrations of different isotopes are obtained by normalization to an inde­
pendently measured concentration of Of course, the normalization technique 
is successful when the time spent for detecting the activities of the different isotopes 
is relatively short, so that only negligible decay of isotopes occur during this period. 
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Development of the Analytical Model for Fission Gas Analysis 
Similar to the TG analysis, in FG analysis, the frequent use of CGCS, which 
reduces the activity of the cover gas to the allowable level, makes any on-line diagnosis 
of correlation between FG activity from a breached pin and the condition of the breach 
difficult and at times impossible to perform. The tasks put forth for the FG analysis 
are performed by an analytical model which is primarily developed to calculate the 
FG activity while correcting for actions of CGCS (i.e., cover gas purging). Reference 
[26] is the source for the material presented in this section. 
Fission Gas Transport Equations Corrected for Cover Gas Purging 
The following assumptions are made to develop the differential equations for 
simulating the dynamics of the migration of FG upward through a layer of sodium 
into the cover gas: 
1. There is ideal mixing in the sodium and the argon cover gas; 
2. Disengagement of FG from the sodium to the argon is dependent on the con­
centration of FG in the sodium phase; and 
3. Fission-product decay is fully described by considering only parent, met astable 
daughter, and daughter isotopes 
The FG transport is mainly based on the assumptions that FG is released from 
a breached cladding site to flowing sodium in the core, and turbulent mixing with 
sodium breaks down FG bubbles to sizes small enough that their transport is similar 
to that of atoms. The concept of FG analysis is applied to interpret FG release 
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dynamics for seven isotopes: 135m ^^A'r, and 
^^Kr .  
The following set of coupled differential equations are developed for calculating 
the number of Xe and Kr isotopes: 
-  [^ \cGih  + + ^p) 
^ = [^liVa^rf + f 2 z [^]CG^2  ~  McG('^3 + + ^p)) 
where 
[2] = number of metastable Kr  and 135m^g. 
[3] = number of and atoms, 
Aj = decay constant of Xe, Kr, in 
Aj = disengagement-rate constant, in s~^, 
A^ = cover-gas-leak-rate constant, in 
Xp — cover-gas-purge-rate constant, in 5~^, 
[ = sodium phase, 
[ ]qq = argon-cover-gas phase, and 
/23 = branching fraction. 
In these equations, cold trapping of iodine and bromine parents and holdup time 
in the sodium itself of FG, leakage of cover-gas, and effects of CGCS operation on FG 
are taken into account respectively by the constants, Aj, A^ and Xp. The values of 
([^liVa'^d) ([^liVa-^d + /23M(7G'^2) the isotope-production terms, denoted 
as Pj. By assuming a linear approximation for an appropriate time interval and when 
purging is done, the values for Pj values can be calculated by: 
Pj = -^ + Cj{Xi + A^ 4- Xp), 
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where 
d t  = time interval between t j  and s ,  
dC  =  activity difference of FG i at the time interval d t ,  i.e., Cj^ i  — Cj ,  
C j  =  measured  va lue  o f  ac t iv i ty  a t  t j ,  nCi lmL,  
= decay constant of FG isotope i ,  in 5~"^. 
The equation for no CGCS operation, can similarly be derived by excluding the 
term Xpi 
^ = Pj-<7*(Ai + Ai) 
where 
dC* — activity difference of FG i at the time interval dt for no purging, i.e., — 
Thus, in short, the algorithm for finding the activity of the FG isotopes corrected 
for CGCS operation is: 
1. measure the initial activity for when CGCS is operating (i.e., Cq at fg), 
2. set the values of Cq = Cq, 
3. repeat step 4 through 8 until j ,  the number of time steps, is equal to the last 
time step, 
4. determine the average value of the cover-gas-purge-rate constant \p during the 
period, tj to ij+i, 
5. calculate the source terms Pj  by using the measured activity of the FG isotopes 
Cj  and  Cj^ i ,  
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6. calculate the corrected activity by using the values of Pj  calculated in 
the previous step, 
7. if the value of is smaller than Cj+i then set = Cj-j-i, and 
8. increment j  (i.e., j  =  j  +  1). 
Step seven of the above algorithm is needed, since when the time steps are inappropri­
ately chosen while CGCS is operating, the corrected activity calculated is sometimes 
larger than the measured activity, because of the error in the numerical calcula­
tions. An upper and lower limit for the time step can be determined by setting 
— ^j+1- The equations, corrected and not corrected for CGCS operation, are 
used to derive the relation for choosing the appropriate time step where the upper 
and lower limits are: 
3_  >dt> .  
By using the above relation, the values of the appropriate time steps were calculated 
fo r  t he  seven  FG i so topes  and  the  ex t reme  cond i t ions  were  found  to  be ,  {90hr  >  d t  
for and (20mzn > dt for 
To validate this method, Nomura and others [26] used measured activities for 
RBCB tests while the CGCS was operating and calculated the values of the corrected 
activity for the seven isotopes. The results indicated that there is little effect of argon 
purging on the shorter half-life isotopes; however, the longer the isotopic half-life 
becomes, the more significant becomes the change of calculated activity compared 
to raw activity, as was expected. They concluded that the method for subtracting 
the effect of CGCS operation has been well confirmed, since all calculated data on 
RBCB experiments show reasonable results. 
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The corrected activity of the FG isotopes can be used to calculate their time 
derivatives. This would provide plots of instantaneous release rates at each moment 
in time. Knowing the time of the occurrence of instantaneous release allows for 
detecting small gas releases, since the pre-existing activities, especially for long lived 
and can be ignored. 
Cumulative Release 
The accumulated amount of the FG released into the cover gas can provide 
information such as determination of the number of breached pins and the breach 
mechanism. This method requires calculating the quantity of released gas in an 
appropriate time interval. The net source rate is then calculated by subtracting 
the background rate from the production term, Pj, and multiplying the result by 
the length of the time interval and the cover gas volume. Then, to calculate the 
cumulative activity released with time, the accumulated activity calculated for the 
previous time steps is added. 
The limitations on this method are: (a) only the longest lived isotope (i.e., 
can be considered, since, by doing so, it makes it possible to compare directly 
with the calculated stored-gas activity in a pin without correcting for isotope decay 
within the appropriate time interval, and (b) only the gas releases where a large 
fraction of the stored gas is expelled in a time comparable to or smaller than the 
half life of (~ b.Zd) are considered. However, the FG analyzer at EBR-II will 
be modified so that it can automatically correct for decay effects in the cumulative-
release inventory, making possible the application to very small breaches that may 
intermittently release their gas over a long period of operation. 
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The number of failed pins in-core at any time can be determined from the cumu­
lative by dividing the cumulative FG activity by the theoretically calculated 
activity stored originally in the pin, which in turn is calculated by using the 
information from a fuel failure location system such as gas tagging. However, it is sug­
gested that the calculation of the number of breached pins can be obtained without 
knowing the location of the breach, since the theoretically calculated activity 
stored originally in the pin, is not affected by the kind of fissile element. This is 
because cumulative fission yields for for the main fissile species 
and are almost equivalent. In other words, the calculation of the number of 
failed elements is also useful under an unidentified stage of breached-fuel operation, 
assuming fuels in the core have similar fissile contents with similar specific fission 
rates. 
Release-to-Birth Ratio 
The different mechanisms through which the FG is released from the breached 
pins (i.e., stored-gas, diffusional, and direct recoil) are briefly described here. 
1. Stored-gas release is a pressure-driven release of internally stored-gas to the 
coolant. It is generally assumed that the stored-gas has achieved radioactive 
equilibrium in most cases (i.e., the gas has the same isotopic composition in 
every release). 
2. Diffusional release occurs when FG comes from the fuel interior itself; hence, 
its rate is governed by the concentration gradient of isotopes through the fuel. 
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3. Direct recoil releases fission product atoms through recoil of the fuel surface at 
the moment of fission. 
The mechanism for the release of FG at any time can be identified by the release-
to-bixth ratio technique. Namely, by using the least squares method, the best-fit value 
of the slope of log{Rif Bi) versus logX^ in a given time interval indicates the type 
of gas release. Based on simplified condition, equations for calculating the 
ratio for the three modes of gas release are [28, 29]: 
1. Stored-Gas Release; 
2. Diffusional Release; 
3. Direct Recoil Release; 
R:  kSL:d  
The parameters used for the above equations are defined as: 
Ae = Effective escape-rate coefficient, 
t  =  Irradiation time, s, 
2 
Dj = Diffusion coefficient, 
a  = Radius of the equivalent sphere of fuel, cm, 
k = Enhancement factor, dimensionless, 
S = Geometric defect area, cm^, 
Zj = Recoil range of FG species, i, cm, 
d = Effective escape-rate coefficient, and 
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Wj = Mass of fissile isotope j  in RBCB pin, g .  
By solving the above equations for steady-state conditions, the values of the change 
in log{RJB^) with respect to log(X^) for stored-gas, diiFusional, and direct recoil 
releases are respectively found to be -1, -1/2, and a small negative value. 
The equations used for release and birth rates (i.e., Ri and respectively) in 
terms of the corrected activity, C* are: 
j ^  j 
for ^^Kr, ^^Kr, 135m and 
Ri = Z7V 
for and 
Bi  = Yi jF jWj  
for the birth rate, where 
/ = branching factor, 
V = cover gas space, cnrfi, 
Yij = cumulative fission yield of isotope i, fraction, and 
F j = specific fission rate for fissile isotope j. 
For simplifying the analytical model, in defining release rates in terms of changes 
in measured cover-gas activities, the complex processes of iodine and bromine pre­
cursors, trapping by the cold trap, and decay of solid precursors are avoided. The 
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above equations are then used to calculate the behavior of {R^/Bi) with time during 
gas release from RBCB operations. 
Determination of the Degassing Constant 
In the previous section the analytical method for FG analysis was described and 
also it was stated that an accurate approximation of the degassing constant used 
in this model is pertinent. The degassing constant accounts for the delay in release 
of FG from liquid sodium to the cover gas. In order to do this, an experimental 
facility, Toshiba fission product loop [30], has been used and an analytical model 
has been developed. In this section, the method which uses the experimental results 
from fission product loop to calculate the degassing constant is described. The main 
source for this description is Mitsutsuka et al. [31]. 
Two different xenon isotopes having considerably different half lives(i.e., 
and were chosen for comparing their release rate to the cover gas. These 
two isotopes are produced by decay of ^^^7; with a 15 min and 
with 9.2hr half-life, respectively. Iodine isotopes dissolve in liquid sodium quite well 
at high sodium temperature and, accordingly, the xenon isotopes are homogeneously 
distributed in the liquid sodium. 
In the schematic shown below, the combined effect of the decay and degassing 
constants on the concentration of the xenon isotopes in the cover gas is illustrated: 
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Cover gas 
iVgZ Ag .iV(135c5) 
Ni, N2, and are the number of atoms of the species, and 
respectively; and, A^, A2, and A3 are the decay constants of 1^5/ 135m 
and respectively. The branching ratios of 1^5/ decay to 135m and 
are respectively denoted by Ym and Yg. Finally, the degassing constant is denoted 
by A^. Thus, the release rate of xenon isotope i from liquid sodium to the cover gas 
can be written as Rj = A j x N^. 
The governing differential equations for the number of iodine and xenon isotopes 
are: 
dNi  
d t  = -AfiVi 
= Ym>^iNi - iV2(A2 + A^) 
= igAiATj + A2AF2 - AFg(Ag + Aj). 
The solution of these differential equations is obtained in the general form and sim­
plified by recognizing: (a) a transient equilibrium is established between and 
N2, since A2 is larger than Aj, and (b) the decay constant A3 is smaller than A]^, 
so equilibrium is not anticipated; however, the sum of A^ and A3 is larger than A^; 
thus, equilibrium condition can also be assumed between and (this will 
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be justified later in this section). Thus, the simplified solutions of the governing 
differential equations for calculating N2 and are derived to be: 
where, ivP is the number of atoms of isotope i  initially at i = 0. 
The release rate ratio of and Eg 2 (i-G., Ag g = can 
then be calculated by, 
P _ ~ -^1 ) + ^7n-^2 
^ ( - ^ 3  + ~  ^ 1 )  
Finally, this equation is rewritten, so that the degassing constant can be solved 
for, by knowing the value for R^ 2 which is measured experimentally. By plotting 
the release ratio -Rg 2 versus time for different values of it can be seen that as 
values of Xj are increased, the time at which and reach equilibrium 
decreases. 
The equation for calculating A j is: 
_ ^(^^2 ~ -^l) + ^171^2 -
^ 2 -
The release rate of isotope i, is obtained by measuring the radioactivity of isotope 
i, A^, in the flowing cover gas and by using the equation: 
„ AiVi{X i  +  f /V i ) {X i  +  f /V2)e> ' i ^ '  
V ' 
where f  is the cover gas flow rate, Vj and V2 are respectively the effective gas volume 
of the expansion tank (where argon gas is exposed to sodium coolant which is obtained 
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from the primary coolant) and the counting tank of the fission product loop, and At  
is the transport delay time from the expansion tank and the counting tank. The 
effect of /, the cover gas flow rate, on the release rates obtained for and 
was found to be minimal if chosen in the range of 200 ~ 600ml f  m in .  Thus, 
the calculation of release rate is considered to be valid for the above cover gas flow 
rate range. 
To calculate A j, the release ratio is obtained by knowing the and R2 
release rates. An experiment was performed and results were reported in Reference 
[31]. In this experiment the sodium temperature was varied to study its effect on the 
value of Aj. While holding the experimental conditions constant, after two hours or 
more, the ratios became constant at each sodium temperature and showed values of 
9.9 to 7.6. Degassing constant values of 1.2 x 10~^s~^ and 2.6 x 10~^5~^ were 
found for sodium temperature of 240 °C and 390 °C, respectively. 
In developing the equation for calculating A j, we assumed that the sum, A^ + Ag, 
is larger than A^, so that an equilibrium condition can also be assumed between 
and The values reported for A j are at least two orders of magnitude 
larger than the decay constant of A]^; thus, justifying the assumption made 
earlier. 
Mitsutsuka et al, [31] concluded their report by stating, "This method was found 
to be effective for determining the FG degassing constant, which has a corresponding 
half-life somewhere between several to 40 min and will be useful for the study of FG 
transport phenomena in liquid metal fast breeder reactors." 
Determination of the Cover Gas Loss Rate 
The material for the description of the two approaches which have been used for 
measuring the cover gas loss rate in EBR-II is taken from work reported by T. D. 
Claar [32] and R. G. Nobles [33]. In the first approach, the rate of decay of some 
gaseous isotopes normally present in the cover gas after a reactor shutdown has been 
used. A constant rate of gas leakage leads to a decrease in the measured activity of 
a radioactive isotope i according to a decay constant, that is larger than its 
radioactive decay constant Aj. In other words, = ^iQgg + Aj. The term A^^^^ 
accounts for the total loss rate of cover gas discharged up the stack, and for cover gas 
samples taken out for TG analysis, and for leakage losses to the building. However, 
the flow rate of discharge through the stack and for the xenon tag recovery system 
can be measured. 
This method was implemented by plotting the log of activity of the chosen FG 
isotope versus time after shutdown. Determination of the slope which corresponds 
to the value of Agyy will lead to calculating the A^. By knowing the value for Aj 
and other leakage rates, the value of the argon gas leakage rate was found to be 
~ bOOmlfmin. 
As continuing efforts reduce the leak rate, the leakage contribution to the effective 
decay constant will become small compared to the radioactive decay constant of the 
isotope chosen for the analysis. Thus, when lower leak rates are anticipated, isotopes 
with longer half-life are used. 
It was observed that the error in fitting the data, i.e., log of the isotope activity, 
to a straight line was rather large. It was thought that this would be remedied 
by using another method which uses the ratio of the measured activity of the FG 
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isotopes. This complex iterative method resulted in a similar expression for the cover 
gas leakage rate; thus, the specifics of its development are not described here. 
The second method used for calculating the cover gas leakage rate is based on 
first principles, namely, mass balance of the argon gas in the core. The basic equation 
is: 
L R  =  S R - U R - A G ,  
where 
LR = leak rate, 
SR = supply rate, 
UR = use rate, and 
AC = accumulation rate. 
The leakage rates calculated under different conditions, were found to be in reasonable 
agreement with the leak rates calculated using the method previously described. 
Evaluation of Fission Gas Analysis 
The diagnostic tools provided by the FG analysis for breached pin diagnosis 
were validated with an RBCB test in EBR-II [26]. In this test, the DN analysis 
techniques were performed in parallel with the FG analysis ones. Typical FG release 
characteristics were obtained by such diagnosis for three different types of breach 
on mixed-oxide elements; creep-rupture, FCMI, and plenum birth defect and the 
important observations were [26]; 
1. All breached elements released stored-gas for some time interval. 
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2. Transition of release mechanism from stored-type to diffusional and lastly recoil 
type depends on the breach type. 
3. Recoil release of FG appears to precede the first DN signal; similarly, this recoil 
FG release has invariably come after release of stored-gas from the pin and some 
difFusional release through the breach site. 
4. FG release of a recoil type continues during stable and quasistable DN signal 
release. 
In conclusion, Nomura and others [26] state: "Further development of these 
diagnosis techniques may allow them to be applied in an on-line system at a LMR as 
a reliable tool for operators." 
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CHAPTER 5. CHARACTERISTICS OF FISSION GAS STORAGE 
AND RELEASE 
The history of FG analysis in EBR-II only pertains to two different occasions 
where the performance of mixed-oxide fuel was of interest. Nomura [26] outlined 
some FG characteristics for mixed-oxide fuel breaches from this study and developed 
a basis for an ES. The results were discussed in the previous chapter. 
In developing a generic ES for diagnosing failure of mixed-oxide fuel, it was recog­
nized that a more comprehensive study must be conducted. But most importantly, 
since the ES designed here will ultimately be used in the IFR concept (a reactor 
concept that includes usage of metal fuel). 
Since there was no experience accumulated in the FG analysis for metal fuel 
elements, it was first necessary to become familiar with the results of this type of 
analysis. To accomplish this, the FG data from May of 1986 to April of 1990 were 
analyzed, with the hope of extending the study to analysis of data from the periods 
of time prior to May of 1986. The expertise gained from the analysis of FG data for 
this period was invaluable but as will be seen, by no means can it be claimed that it 
was comprehensive. 
The data for this analysis were obtained from the DAS at EBR-II. In DAS, data 
are archived using different time intervals, ranging from one minute to one hour. The 
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main consideration in selecting the time interval for recovering the archived data was 
the amount of data obtained versus the accuracy of the calculation. It is desirable to 
use one-minute data in the numerical techniques for FG analysis, since the shortest 
half-life of the FG isotope studied is in the order of a few minutes. However, the 
task of copying one-minute data for an approximately five-years period would have 
required an unreasonable amount of time, and a large number of magnetic tapes 
for storing the data. Therefore, ten-minute averaged data were used which caused 
very little compromise in the accuracy of the calculations and at the same time were 
quite manageable. The only noticeable drawback was in retrieving the DN signal. 
Associated with some breaches, very sharp DN spikes are seen, particularly in metal 
fuel. When ten-minute averaged data are used, the DN spike is not noticeable, since 
by averaging the data over ten-minute intervals, spikes that have only a few second 
width are missing or decreased in amplitude. 
In this chapter, to provide a better understanding of FG release from different 
metal and mixed-oxide fuels, a general description of radiation effects on different fuel 
types used in EBR-II is given. Also, a description of the diagnostic tools provided 
by the FG analysis is provided. Finally, by using the plots which depict the results 
of the FG analysis, we will study the behavior of FG release from breaches that have 
occurred in the past five years. The expertise gained from this analysis is then used 
to generate the rules used in the KB of the ES. 
The material for the analysis of FG was gathered from numerous consultation 
sessions with W. N. Beck, J. D. B. Lambert, K. C. Gross, J. H. Bottcher, and R. V. 
Strain. This group has been directly involved in the design and performance of fuel 
elements (during normal, or RBCB operation) for many years at Argonne. W. N. 
74 
Beck is considered to be one of the pioneers in the metal fuel design program at EBR-
II. The other members of this group have been the primary investigators in the RBCB 
program at EBR-II, emphasizing on the Japanese-RBCB program (concentrating on 
mixed-oxide fuel). Also, W. N. Beck, and K. C. Gross have directly been involved 
in the fuel failure diagnostics; thus, they are considered to be the domain experts in 
the development of this ES. 
Radiation Effects on Metal and Oxide Fuel Elements 
To better understand the results of FG analysis, a basic knowledge of radiation 
effects on metal and mixed-oxide fuel elements and FG release mechanism is required. 
In different types of metal fuel, it is seen that in general the radiation effects vary 
with the amount of plutonium enrichment and also with the irradiation time (burnup 
of the fuel). So far, in EBR-II, three types of alloys have been used, namely, with 
0,8, and 19 percent by weight plutonium. The burnup can also be categorized into 
three groups, less than 8, between 8 and 12, and higher than 12 atomic percent. In 
the case of mixed-oxide fuel, the variation in storage and release of FG is generally 
attributed to the burnup. 
It must be noted that this generalization is rather broad. However, we will use 
this model for the development of this ES, since there are no alternatives. This short­
coming is due to the fact that, in approximately a third of the breaches detected in 
the past five years by FG analysis, the subassemblies containing breached elements 
were not positively identified by TG analysis at the time of breach; or, if they were, 
it was not clear which element in the subassembly had breached (since, some exper­
imental subassemblies included more than one type of fuel element). Therefore, it is 
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impossible to incorporate any more detailed information on the effects caused by the 
differences in the alloy type and burnup in the analysis of FG data (for the past five 
years), even though we believe there is a strong correlation between the two. 
Before studying the effects of radiation, an important factor in FG release related 
to a difference in the design of metal and mixed-oxide fuel elements must be addressed. 
In metal fuel elements the gap between the fuel and cladding is filled with sodium, 
whereas, in mixed-o^dde fuel the gap is filled with gas. As a result, mixed-oxide fuel 
elements, which have lower thermal conductivity values, operate at higher internal 
pressure than the metal fuel elements. 
Also, in the discussion that follows, it is assumed that the FG has reached 
isotopic equilibrium. This is a safe assumption, since most natural breaches occur at 
burnup levels which require times that are orders of magnitude longer than the time 
required for reaching isotopic equilibrium. 
In the remainder of this section, the storage and the release of FG (taking into 
account the type of fuel, burnup, and the breach location) are discussed. 
Radiation Effects on Metal Fuel 
The effects of irradiation on the storage of FG in zero, medium, and high pluto­
nium content metal fuel are depicted in Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, respectively. At the 
initiation of irradiation the fuel is 100% dense, as is seen in the pictures in the top 
row of the figures provided. The peak of the neutron flux is located at the regions 
of the fuel whose pictures are provided in the columns in the middle. The general 
effects that are commonly seen in the three types of metal fuel are that, as irradiation 
progresses, the fuel expands due to the formation of bubbles. The gap between the 
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fuel and cladding allows for a 33% radial expansion of the fuel which is sufficient 
to permit inter-connection of gas bubbles. This in turn allows release of FG to the 
plenum region of the fuel element. As a result, the fuel becomes weak and the main 
loading on the cladding is caused by the gas accumulated in the plenum. 
However, the distinction made in storage of gas between the three different fuel 
types is attributed to the segregation of the fuel content seen in medium or high 
enriched fuel at higher burnup, where the denser fuel migrates to the outer layer of 
the fuel. This is called the "banding effect." Depending on the radial temperature 
gradient and the enrichment of plutonium, the fuel content segregation can vary. 
Generally, this effect becomes pronounced in highly enriched ternary U-Pu-Zr metal 
elements at high radial temperature gradients. Along the bands of segregation, cracks, 
and voids, the transportation of FG to the outside of the fuel region is enhanced. 
A typical schematic of a metal fuel element is depicted in Figure 5.4. In general. 
Figure 5.2: The effect of irradiation on 8 — Pu metal fuel 
Figure 5.3: The effect of irradiation on 20 — Pu metal fuel 
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Figure 5.4: A typical design of a MK-II fuel element 
the clad failures observed to date occur in three general areas, weld (plenum), dimple, 
and along the fuel column. In the case of a weld breach, the longer half-life FG 
isotopes are released and very little of the short half-life gas is expected to escape. 
This assumes that isotopic equilibrium of FG isotopes is reached. .A, typical breach 
due to weld failure is depicted in Figure 5.5. The breach size is the overriding factor 
in determining the release rate and volume of FG. 
In the fuel column breach of metal elements, it is expected that the FG isotopes 
will be released from both the plenum and the fuel itself. However, it is expected 
that gas from the fuel region will be released first. The plenum gas (mostly long 
half-life FG) diffuses to the breached area, being driven by the pressure differential 
that exists between the plenum and the fuel column after the breach occurrence. 
This is even more pronounced if the location of the breach along the fuel column is 
close to the plenum. This is due to the fact that the irradiated fuel structure, as 
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Figure 5.5: A typical weld breach in a metal fuel element 
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described previously, facilitates the release of the FG from the fuel into the plenum. 
However, if the fuel restricts the release of FG either to the plenum or to the breach 
site then a "bottle neck" effect is seen. Depending on the location of the breach with 
respect to the swollen fuel, the plenum gas release is affected. These characteristics 
are summarized in Figure 5.6. 
A typical fuel column breach is shown in Figure 5.7. When the fuel column 
breach occurs, it is expected that most of the FG isotopes will be released by recoil 
from the surface of the exposed fuel. The DN signal emitted following metal fuel 
column breaches is caused by the release of cesium which is accumulated below the 
plenum gas and above the fuel region, as is illustrated in Figure 5.6. If any indication 
is given by the DNDs, the release of sodium and cesium causes only a sharp spike. 
In the design of the MK-II metal fuel, dimples were included. This feature is 
displayed in Figure 5.4. Three dimples were manufactured by pressing the cladding 
immediately above the fuel region. The reason for including this feature was to confine 
the fuel inside the element. However, clad failures occurred at the dimple areas and 
so dimples were excluded from the successive metal fuel designs (i.e., MK-III and 
MK-IV). 
In the dimple breach, the gas stored in the plenum (long half-life FG) has to 
compete with the gas generated in the fuel region (mixture of long and short half-life 
FG) for escaping to the coolant. If the fuel has interconnected porosity (thus the 
pressurization of the plenum region), it is expected that the FG from the plenum 
is most likely to prevail in escaping. Although in this type of dimple breach most 
of the gas is released from the plenum region, it differs from a weld breach. This 
diiference is caused by the fact that the plenum gas must diffuse through the sodium 
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Xe.Kr+Tag 
Na+Cs Na+Cs 
Flow 
Release Sequence 
1. (Na-Cs) 
• Gas from fuel (short 
1/2 life) DN precursors 
• DN signal depends on 
Na release rate. 
2, Plenum, gas tag (if present) 
Result 
1. Depressurized Element 
• Drop in cladding stress. 
• No crack propagation 
2. Decrease in Fuel Thermal 
Conductivity. 
3. No Fuel Extrusion 
4. Steady Low Gas Release 
5. Negligible DN Signal 
NOTE: Fuel has swollen to clad, 
(i.e. no gap) 
Figure 5.6: Metal fuel gas and DN emitters release characteristics 
Figure 5.7: A typical pre-thinned fuel column breach in a metal fuel element 
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Figure 5.8: A typical dimple breach in a MK-II metal fuel element 
contained in the element to reach the breach area, whereas, in a weld breach, there 
is no resistance mechanism to the gas release except the breach size. If the dimple 
breach occurs prior to the interconnection of porosity in the fuel, the breach appears 
to be similar to a fuel column breach. This type of breach is displayed in Figure 5.8. 
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Radiation Effects on Mixed-Oxide Fuel 
The dimple and weld breaches in metal fuel elements are considered to be caused 
by manufacturing anomalies. The mixed-oxide elements do not include dimples as 
part of the design; also, natural plenum breaches have not yet been observed. How­
ever, the plenum breach in mixed-oxide fuel has been simulated by manufacturing 
the fuel element with a hole in the plenum region. The characteristics of this breach 
(which is not necessarily similar to a natural plenum breach) will be seen in the anal­
ysis of data in the next section. It is expected that plenum breaches in mixed-oxide 
fuels for the most part will behave similarly to those in metal fuel, with a difference in 
the rate of gas release after the initial burst of gas. It is expected that an irradiated 
mixed-oxide element readily releases gas at higher rates while still maintaining fuel 
strength even at higher burnup levels. This provides a better mechanism of transport 
of FG to the plenum region in mixed-oxide fuel. 
In a fuel column mixed-oxide breach, we would expect that a great quantity 
of stored FG will be released initially. This stored gas would primarily consist of 
the FG isotopes with longer half-life, since it is assumed that the FG has reached 
isotopic equilibrium. After the initial burst of gas, the mixed-oxide fuel element is 
depressurized, and sodium can enter the fuel pin. In this case, a sodium uranate 
product is formed at the fuel clad interface and is ultimately released to the coolant. 
Sodium uranate results from the chemical interaction of sodium with fuel at the 
fuel clad interface. This causes an unusual rise in the level of the short half-life gas 
in the cover gas, since the FG is now generated in the coolant. After a period of 
time the gaps allowing sodium uranate release close and a steady release of both 
short and long half-life gas via diffusion from the fuel element itself is expected. 
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The volumetric expansion of the reaction product produces additional stresses on the 
cladding, causing the breach to enlarge, and exposing greater quantities of fuel to 
the coolant. Therefore, in mixed-oxide fuel column breaches, we expect to observe 
an indication of the breach by finding an increase in the FG activity at first, followed 
by an increase in DN signal after a period of time. 
In mixed-oxide fuel elements, the breach is theoretically believed to be initiated 
by either the internal-over-pressurization of the element (creep-rupture) or FCMI. 
The distinction between FCMI and creep-rupture is clearly outlined in theory; how­
ever, it can not be as obviously identified from the data analyzed in the past five 
years. Therefore, we will avoid distinguishing between these two types of fuel column 
breaches in the mixed-oxide fuel until more evidence of these phenomena have been 
detected. 
Another phenomenon, observed in both metal and mixed-oxide fuel elements 
during the diffusion in fuel column breaches, is sudden release of excessive short or 
long half-life FG. For the lack of better term, we call this "burping of FG." 
Finally, background on the characteristics of the storage of FG in fuel and release 
of FG from the fuel element is presented, so that the analysis of the FG data provided 
in a later sections would become clearer. This field is very extensive and we only 
scratch the surface. 
Description of the Diagnostic Tools Provided by FG Analysis 
The three diagnostic tools which are provided by the FG analysis are: (1) the 
corrected-for-purging activity of seven FG isotopes, (2) the cumulative and 
(3) the slope of release to birth ratio of seven FG isotopes versus their decay con-
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Figure 5.9: The corrected and not corrected-for-purging activity of 
stant at a given time. The analytical methods which are used for developing these 
diagnostic tools were described in Chapter four. 
The activity of FG isotopes, when corrected for purging, shows a higher value, 
as is expected. Also, it is expected that the longer the isotopic half-life becomes, the 
more significant the change of corrected activity from raw activity becomes, since the 
effect of purging is negligible compared to loss due to radioactive decay in isotopes 
with a shorter half-life. Therefore, the effect of purging of cover gas on the activity of 
133 can clearly be observed. Also, the raw and corrected activities for and 
135tu Ye (which are representatives of the longer and shorter half-life FG isotopes, 
respectively) are depicted in Figures 5.9 and 5.10. 
The activity detected by the GLASS at EBR-II is often used for initiating cleanup 
of cover gas. However, once the CGCS has been operated the true value of the activity 
of the FG in the cover gas is lost. Thus, one could not use it as a diagnostic tool. By 
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Figure 5.10: The corrected and not corrected-for-purging activity of Kr 
providing the corrected-for-purging activity, this piece of information can be used as a 
diagnostic tool, since by knowing the true activity of FG released, one can distinguish 
between the mixed-oxide and metal breaches. 
The second diagnostic tool, cumulative activity, can be used as an indi­
cator of a new breach. The equilibrium activity of stored gas of is estimated 
to be 500Ci/pin. Also, a distinct change in the slope of the cumulative activity is 
seen when stored gas is released in a new breach. However, in analytical methods 
used for calculating the cumulative activity, there is no mechanism which takes the 
decay of FG activity into account long after the initial release of the stored gas. This, 
unfortunately, invalidates the use of cumulative activity in multi-breach situations. 
In calculating the cumulative activity for the past five years, we have set this value 
to zero when the activity reaches background level. This will not remedy 
the problem of over-accumulation; however, it allows resetting the value when the 
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effects of breached elements which have been left in-core for long periods of time have 
disappeared, or when there are not any breached elements present. 
The third and most powerful diagnostic tool provided by the FG analysis is the 
slope of release to birth ratio of the seven FG isotopes versus their decay constant 
at a given time. A typical three-dimensional plot of the release to birth ratio versus 
decay constant at a given time is depicted in Figure 5.11. Using the least square 
method, the best fit line is obtained whose slope is used as a diagnostic tool. In this 
surface plot, the effects of a mixed-oxide fuel column breach on the release to birth 
ratio of the seven FG isotopes are seen. In the remainder of this discussion, for the 
sake of simplicity, the absolute value of the slope is used. For example, if the slope 
is —0.1 we will refer to it as 0.1. 
The plot of the slope with time indicates the type of breach (fuel column or 
plenum) and also indicates the characteristics of the progress of a breach. Coupled 
with the DN analysis, it is a powerful tool for indicating the severity of the breach. 
This information is available, since, the slope can be used as a tool for comparing 
the release of the seven FG isotopes relative to each other. In simpler words, when 
a slope of greater than 0.5 is seen, we have an indication that more of the longer 
half-life isotopes have been released than the shorter half-life ones, and when a slope 
is less than 0.5 the opposite is indicated. When the slope is approximately 0.5 we 
have an indication of diffusional release from the fuel element itself. 
FG Analysis of Breached Elements (May 1986 to April 1990) 
For analyzing the FG behavior, FORTRAN programs were developed using the 
models described in the previous chapter and the results were plotted. The plots 
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Figure 5.11: An arbitrary surface response of release to birth ratio and decay con­
stant for seven FG isotopes with time lapse of irradiation 
included were the reactor power, DN signal corrected for purging activity of 
Kr, the cumulative activity of and the slope of the release to birth 
ratio of the seven FG isotopes considered versus the decay constant. 
For identifying a breach all plots had to be studied simultaneously and it seemed 
logical to display the plots in parallel. The seven The FG isotopes can be categorized 
according to their half-lives into three groups. The FG isotopes ^^A'r, and 
135m Ye with half-lives of 5.3 days, 1.3 hours, and 15.3 minutes respectively are 
chosen to show the behavior of FG isotopes with long, medium, and short half-
lives. Otherwise, due to the number of plots that had to be displayed in one place, 
preparation of this display would have not been manageable. 
As will be seen in the plots provided, the value of the slope is not provided while 
the reactor is not at power. The reason is that the value of release to birth rate of 
the FG is meaningless when the fission rate value is very small. 
One of the main difficulties encountered in analyzing the FG data was that many 
breaches were not identified by TG analysis, due to operation of CGCS for removal 
of the FG from the cover gas. Along with the FG, the TG is also lost. It has 
been common practice to tag only some experimental subassemblies. In particular, 
during the past five years some experimental metal fuel elements that breached were 
not tagged. However, after the subassemblies are removed (sometimes many reactor 
runs later), breached elements in the subassembly were identified by post-irradiation 
examinations. Mostly, untagged metal fuel elements that breached remained in-core 
for many runs, since breached metal elements release negligible amount of DN signal 
and reactor operators are required to take action only when a high level of the DN 
signal is detected. In Tables, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, which contain the listing of 
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breached elements, the suspected leakers (not detected by TG at the time of breach) 
are indicated by attaching a question mark to their subassembly name. Also, the 
star attached to the subassembly names indicates that the subassembly was placed 
in-core with an already breached element. 
The results of the FG analysis are plotted on a monthly basis for the entire five 
years. A complete set of these plots is provided in the Appendix. Only the important 
events that allowed for deriving some of the heuristic rules for the development of 
the ES are discussed and redundant discussions are avoided. 
Analysis of Breached Elements in 1986 
In Table 5.1 a listing of the breaches that occurred during 1986 is given. In 
May, reactor run 139A began after a long reactor shutdown with no breached ele­
ments present in-core, as was indicated by the appearance of the background level 
of DN signal at approximately 200cps, absence of FG, and the existence of tramp 
background in the slope plot. When there are no breached elements in-core, there is 
very little release of FG from the tramp uranium which is dispersed uniformly in the 
coolant, causing a uniform distribution of points between 0 and 0.4, as is observed in 
the plot of slope. At the end of run 139A, on May 20th, a mixed-oxide element breach 
along the fuel column region occurred which caused a spike in the DN signal which 
in turn caused the shutdown of the reactor. When a breach causes the shutdown or 
when a breach occurs in a short reactor run (less than 5 days) the characteristics 
of the FG release are not observed, since the fission rate drops immediately and the 
release of FG is not stabilized after the initial burst of gas. 
After the shutdown of the reactor, the internal pressure of the element dropped 
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Table 5.1: Listing of breaches in 1986 
Date Leaker Fuel Type Burnup Breach Type 
1 05-20 XY-7C oxide mid. fuel col. 
2 05-25 XY-7C oxide mid. fuel col. 
3 05-29 XY-7C oxide mid. fuel col. 
4 06-01 XY-21A metal OPu high fuel col. 
5 06-10 XY-7C oxide mid. fuel col. 
6 07-08 X385A oxide low fuel col. 
7 07-27 X426 oxide high fuel col. 
8 07-28 XY-19A* oxide high fuel col. 
9 08-04 XY-19A oxide high fuel col. 
10 10-22 X399A metal OPu med. fuel col. 
11 10-24 X399A? metal OPu med. dimple 
12 10-27 X399A? metal OPu med. dimple 
13 11-17 X381B oxide high fuel col. 
14 11-23 XY-23* oxide med. fuel col. 
15 12-10 X396 oxide med fuel col. 
and as a result, sodium was allowed to enter into the element. The sodium remained in 
the element during the shutdown period and as of result sodium uranate was formed. 
The operating limit on the DN signal was then raised to allow further irradiation of 
the experimental subassembly XY-7C. When the reactor was brought up to power, 
the sodium uranate by-products were released to the coolant, causing a rise in the 
DN signal to a higher level than the one initially observed at the birth of the breach. 
This is observed at the startup of the second segment of run 139A. 
A few days after the occurrence of the second breach in XY-7C, FG was re­
leased by diffusion from two elements, indicated by the slope of approximately 0.5. 
Another commonly encountered phenomenon, which occurs at the startup of a run 
with a breached element in-core, is that the slope value is initially one and grad­
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ually decreases. This is explained by the fact that a fraction of the long half-life 
isotopes released from the breached element in the previous reactor run still exists 
in the cover gas, even though FG was not generated during shutdown. Thus, when 
the reactor is started up again, which results in generation of short half-life gas, the 
value of the slope gradually decreases. This behavior is observed at the startup of 
the second segment of run 139A on May 22nd. On May 25th and 29th, two other 
mixed-oxide elements breached in XY-7C with similar characteristics. The slope plot 
shows erratic behavior when elements are breached; and after a short period of time, 
diffusional release is observed with occasional indication of burps. Coinciding with 
occurrence of the breach, a step increase in the cumulative activity is observed. 
On June 4th, a metal element breached. This breach was identified from the 
tag information and by examining the element after removal from the core. How­
ever, there was no indication of this breach from the FG activity or DN signal. The 
reason was that FG released from a metal fuel is approximately two orders of magni­
tude lower than from mixed-oxide fuel. In simpler words, the FG released from the 
breach in the metal element was swamped by the FG released by the three previously 
breached mixed-oxide elements. Finally, the breach of a fourth element in XY-7C 
caused the termination of run 139A. The subassembly XY-7C was then removed from 
the core while XY-21A remained in-core. 
To verify the statement, "mixed-oxide elements release more gas than the metal 
elements," the gas released from the mixed-oxide elements during June 1st to June 
5th is compared with the gas released from the metal fuel during June 21nd to 26nd. 
In both cases, there was diffusional gas release. Another interesting observation from 
this comparison is that the calculated values for the slope during diffusional release 
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are higher in the later period than in the earlier one. This is caused by the large 
quantity of long half-life gas released in run 139A contributing to the gas released 
from the metal element. 
On July 8th, unique characteristics were observed from the breach in subassem­
bly X385A. The mixed-oxide element released gas a few days prior to the release of 
the DN emitter. Also, gas was released in two steps and in the second step more of 
the shorter half-life gas was released. From observing this behavior, occurrence of a 
creep-rupture breach was indicated. However, for the lack of more evidence from the 
post irradiation examination of the element and lack of experience in the behavior of 
this type of breach, we refrained from reaching such a conclusion. 
Subassembly X385A was removed before startup of run 139E. In run 140A a 
typical mixed-oxide element breached. Very little was released due to the 
immediate reactor shutdown and the fact that the breach site was located along the 
fuel column. The characteristic of a new breach was not seen in the plot of slope due 
to the short duration of run 139E. The subassembly X426 was removed from the core 
at the end of run 140A. At the startup of run 140B, subassembly XY-19A, which had 
already contained a breached element, was placed in-core. 
On Aug. 4th, another element in XY-19A breached, causing a step increase in 
the DN signal. The burping effect was very pronounced from this breach. This can be 
attributed to the high burnup level of the elements in this subassembly. At the end of 
run 140B, a large release of gas was observed. This gas was associated with the second 
breached element in XY-19A. The gas stored in the central void of this element was 
confined by hardened fuel surrounding this central void. A sudden decrease in the 
temperature of coolant outside the fuel caused a large radial temperature gradient 
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across the central void region, resulting in the formation of a crack which allowed a 
sudden release of gas from the void. 
The subassembly XY-19A was kept in-core for run 141A. At startup of 141A 
a DN spike is observed which is not associated with occurrence of a new breach. 
However, it is associated with the sudden release of DN emitters from the breached 
elements in XY-19A. During the reactor shutdown the coolant pumps are not oper­
ating which causes the sodium in the breached fuel element to stay dormant. At the 
startup for the successive run the sodium in the breached element, which contains 
excessive sodium uranate by-products, is pumped into the core resulting in detection 
of a DN spike by the DNDs. 
During the month of October, three metal elements breached in subassembly 
X399, one being a fuel column breach and two a dimple breach. The stored gas 
release from a metal fuel column breach was much smaller than the release from the 
fuel column breach of a mixed-oxide element in XY-19A. However, the release from 
the metal breach was noticeable since the existing mixed-oxide breached elements 
had diffusionally released gas for a long period of time. In comparing the behavior 
of dimple breached elements with the fuel column, it was observed that more of long 
half-life gas is released in the former type of breach as is indicated in the plots of 
slope and activity. Run 141A was terminated due to the breach of a mixed-
oxide element in X381B. After the termination of run 141A all sources of FG were 
removed from the core and subassembly XY-23, which contained a breached element, 
was placed in-core. 
In run 141B, it is seen that the power level is suddenly dropped and raised to the 
original value. This power change was accompanied by a change in DN signal. The 
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change in power caused an increase in the pressure difference across the breach sur­
face, favoring a sudden release of DN emitters. This pressure difference was induced 
by a sudden change of temperature in the coolant as compared to the temperature 
of sodium trapped in the breached fuel element. Since XY-23 contained a fuel col­
umn breached element, escape of shorter half-life gas is seen to accompany the DN 
emitters. This is also indicated by a sudden decrease of slope. XY-23 was removed 
after termination of run 141B. In run 141C, an over-power test was conducted to 
study the performance of elements in X396. Due to the power spike occurring at 
the end of 141C, an element in X396 breached, releasing an excessive amount of 
This activity decreased to levels lower than 2QQnCilml, and the value of 
cumulative was set to zero. To this point, the value of the cumulative activity 
in the cover gas for the entire 1986 period, during which 15 clad failures occurred, 
was calculated. It can be confirmed that the total number of failed fuel elements 
was 15, since approximately 500Cz is associated with the release of from each 
failed element; thus, for 15 failed element 7500Ci must be accumulated. This is the 
cumulative calculated at the end of 1986. 
Analysis of Breached Elements in 1987 
A listing of the failed elements and the time of failure is given in Table 5.2, where 
those breaches not identified by the TG analysis are identified with a question mark. 
Most of the sources of FG that were not identified by TG analysis were the elements 
in subassemblies X420A and X421A. The only information available for identifying 
the failed elements in these subassembly was the total number of breached elements 
in each of these subassembly, and the type of breach. This was extracted from the 
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Table 5.2: Listing of breaches in 1987 
Date Leaker Fuel Type Burnup Breach Type 
16 01-14 X420A? metal ? weld 
17 01-19 X420A? metal ? weld 
18 02-06 X381B oxide high fuel col. 
19 03-10 MK-II metal OPu mid. dimple 
20 04-05 MK-II metal OPu mid. dimple 
21 06-27 X420A? metal ? fuel col. 
22 07-03 X420A? metal ? fuel col. 
23 08-13 X420A? metal ? weld 
24 08-28 XY-27 metal 8Pu low. weld 
25 09-02 X421A? metal ? weld 
26 09-05 X421A? metal ? weld 
27 10-11 X421A? metal 19Pu high fuel col. 
28 11-08 X429 metal OPu low weld 
29 12-07 X421A? metal ? fuel col. 
post-irradiation examination of elements in these subassemblies. Fortunately, from 
the FG analysis, it was possible to distinguish between a weld and fuel column breach 
in metal elements. Therefore, we were able to associate a breach with an element 
in this subassembly by keeping in mind the total number of breached elements in 
each subassembly and the type of breach. However, we were not able to indicate the 
burnup level or the alloy type of these elements, since the sequence of the occurrence 
of the breaches was not known and also in each of these subassemblies, elements with 
different types of alloy were used. 
During the first 8 days of January, background levels in the DN signal and the 
short half-life FG were observed. Normally, the background level is characterized by 
uniform distribution of points below 0.3 in the plot of slope. However, due to levels of 
activity of higher than the background (caused by the last breach occurring in 
1986), unique characteristics were observed in the plot of slope. Nevertheless, when 
the activity of ^^^Xe reached the background level, only tramp characteristics were 
observed. 
On January 14th and 19th, two elements failed due to faulty welding. Associated 
with these breaches, no release of DN emitters and short half-life gas is observed. 
However, a considerable amount of long half-life gas was released, as was expected. 
The plot of slope shows identical characteristics to the activity of long half-life gas, 
since this was the only contributing factor in the calculation of slope. 
On February 7th, a mixed-oxide element breached in subassembly X381B. Due to 
the high burnup level of this element, excessive amounts of DN emitters were released 
into the core which ultimately caused the termination of run 142B. Subassembly 
X381A was removed from the core after the termination of run 142B. During most of 
run 143A, the reactor did not contain any breached elements. On March 10th, a MK-
II driver fuel breached in the dimple region. Very little short half-life gas was released 
from this breach, however, considerable long half-life gas was released to the cover gas. 
The long half-life gas was released for a longer duration with a smaller initial burst 
than the one observed from a weld failure. Another MK-II dimple failure occurred 
on April 5th, which showed identical characteristics. Important characteristics of 
the weld and dimple breaches are, no DN signal increase and negligible increase in 
activity of short half-life gas. 
On May 6th, gas release is seen even though the reactor is shutdown. This gas 
release is caused by removing or moving subassemblies containing breached elements. 
Initially, the background levels in the DN signal and FG are observed in run 144A. 
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The level of the DN ^gnal and short half-life gas is observed to vary with the level 
of reactor power. After ten days of irradiation, relatively small amounts of long half-
life gas was released from either one or a combination of the breached elements in 
subassemblies, X420A, X421A, and 2 MK-II elements. We believe that this gas was 
released from the elements that breached due to weld failure, since in this type of 
breach the breach size is relatively small, thus allowing release of gas for a relatively 
longer duration of time. 
On June 27th, the characteristics of a fuel column breach on metal fuel were 
observed. This event was repeated on July 3rd. Both breached elements were believed 
to be in subassembly X420A, since no other metal elements could have been suspected 
to have breached along the fuel column during run 144A. The amount of gas released 
is considerably smaller than the gas released from the mixed-oxide fuel. Also, contrary 
to the behavior of mixed-oxide fuel column breach, there is no indication of the release 
of DN emitter. 
At this point, a clear picture of the FG characteristics of weld and fuel column 
breaches on metal fuel was observed and a comparison was conducted. In a weld 
breach, emission of short half-life gas is not seen, whereas in fuel column breaches 
noticeable amounts are detected. Also, in weld breaches, the amount of long half-life 
gas released is considerably more than the gas released from a fuel column breach. 
The FG behavior of the next four breached elements were similar to the fuel 
column and weld breaches, previously described. On October 11th, a unique breach 
along the fuel column occurred in a 19% Pu metal element. The gas release char­
acteristics indicate that the gas is cycling in large cavities which are formed in 19% 
Pu, highly burned up metal elements; thus, releases occurred with a frequency of 
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approximately 12 hours. In one of the cycles, gas accumulated in a large void was 
released and caused a spike that showed characteristics of occurrence of a new breach. 
In run 146A, on Nov. 8th, a metal fuel breached in the plenum region. The 
effects of the breach have been distorted due to changing of the reactor thermal 
power. 
At the end of November, a sudden increase in the activity of was 
observed. This was caused by the release of pockets of gas that form on the inner 
surface of the cladding of the fuel column breached elements. 
On December 7th, a fuel column breach occurred in a metal element placed in 
subassembly X421A. The effects of inter-connection of voids and ultimately formation 
of cavities, which causes depressurization of the element and release of stored gas, 
are shown, where a considerable amount of FG was released approximately 20 days 
after the element initially breached. 
Analysis of Breached Elements in 1988 
A listing of the breached elements is given in Table 5.3. The subassemblies X420B 
and X421A contained elements that were not tagged and the procedure described 
previously was followed to identify the breached element. 
Subassemblies XY-27 and X429 were removed from the core after the termination 
of run 146B and X420A was removed in April prior to startup of run 148A. An FPS 
was placed in-core for run 148A, and the characteristics of gas release by direct recoil 
are displayed in the plot of slope. After run 148A was terminated, the FPS was 
removed from the core. 
Other breaches in 1988 were similar to the ones described previously, except for 
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Table 5.3: Listing of breaches in 1988 
Date Leaker Fuel Type Burnup Breach Type 
30 07-18 X421A? metal ? weld 
31 08-01 X421A? metal ? weld 
32 08-18 X482 metal 19Pu high fuel col. 
33 09-15 X420B? metal ? weld 
34 10-01 X420B? metal ? weld 
35 10-18 X420B? metal ? weld 
36 12-27 X482 metal 19Pu high fuel col. 
the fuel column breach which occurred in the element in subassembly X482. The 
element in this subassembly contained 19%Pu; therefore, the same characteristic 
"percolating effect" as in the breach that occurred in X421A on October 11, 1987 
was expected to be seen. Perhaps, this effect was not seen due to the presence of 
other breached elements in-core (i.e., X421A, and X420B). 
Analysis of Breached Elements in 1989 and 1990 
The breached elements occurring in 1989 and 1990 are listed in Table 5.4. Only 
the breached element in subassembly X420B, was not positively identified at the 
time of breach in 1989. A typical fuel column metal element breach was seen on 
January 26, 1989. Subassemblies X420B and X482 were then removed from the core 
after run 150B. Two breaches were detected during April of 1989 that showed typical 
characteristics of a metal weld failure and fuel column mixed-oxide breach. The gas 
released from the element in XC-IA did not appear in the plot, since its quantity 
was orders of magnitude smaller than the gas released from the element in X460 
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Table 5.4: Listing of breaches in 1989 and 1990 
Date Leaker Fuel Type Burnup Breach Type 
37 01-26-89 X420B? metal ? fuel col. 
38 03-06-89 XC-IA metal OPu low weld 
39 03-15-89 X460 oxide high fuel col. 
40 10-31-89 X468 * oxide unirr. plenum 
41 11-21-89 X482A metal OPu high fuel col. 
42 01-26-90 X470 * oxide unirr. plenum 
(mixed-oxide). 
During, April through October of 1989, the analysis of the FG data is not pro­
vided since the reactor was not at power. On Nov. 21, 1989, in X482A a metal 
element breached along the fuel column, which was indicated by a spike in the DN 
signal. The spike in the DN signal is rarely observed in a breach of metal elements; 
however, the DN spike displayed as a result of the breach in X482A can be attributed 
to the high burnup value and the alloy type (19%Pu). 
After the termination of run 152C the subassembly X482A was removed from 
the core. For run 153A, four unirradiated mixed-oxide elements, manufactured with 
each containing a hole in the plenum region of the elements, were placed in-core in 
subassembly X470A. In this case, the characteristics of the storage and release of 
gas in mixed-oxide fuel is observed, since as gas is released from the fuel, it is able 
to escape to the core. The gas released during the month of February of 1990 was 
associated with diffusional release from X482A. This analysis of the event was based 
on the fact that the elements in X470 were not irradiated for a long enough period 
of time to be able to release gas. Eventually these elements reached burnup levels 
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that allowed for generation of gas void. The gas release from the void region of 
the mixed-oxide elements in X470, were observed in three occasions. These releases 
were caused by cracks that were formed in the fuel pins which in turn caused internal 
depressurization of the element. After the fuel structure was depressurized, there was 
no further release of stored gas; thus, the fuel cracks had sealed. The gas then built 
up in the central void again. This observation allowed us to learn the mechanism by 
which the FG is stored in the plenum region of the mixed-oxide element. 
This concludes the discussion on the important fuel pin breach events that have 
occurred for the past five years. We used the knowledge gained from the analysis of 
this data to extract the heuristic rules and the rules generated by inductive learning 
that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6. DERIVATION OF RULES FROM INDUCTIVE 
LEARNING 
In this chapter, the development of the rule tree generated for FG analysis is 
discussed. The results of FG analysis, described in the previous chapter, were used to 
generate the rules by using inductive learning. Heuristic rules were also incorporated 
into the system. The description of how 1st Class Fusion [34] (the knowledge engi­
neering product) is used and the techniques used for developing rules for FG analysis 
are given. 
Basic Description of 1st Class Fusion 
The material for this description is extracted from Reference [35]. The system 
is interfaced with the user by means of six screen "layers." The first screen, the file 
screen, is used to allow the user to retrieve an old KB, create a new one, print or 
export an existing KB shell out to DOS, quit, or view what Fusion calls a roadmap, 
which is described later. 
The second screen of Fusion is called the definitions screen. In this screen, each 
column represents factors to be considered in solving the problem at hand, and the 
last column represents the results that can be determined from this KB. The defi­
nitions screen forces the user to think about what factors are important and what 
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results are possible, and it allows these factors and values to be added, deleted, and 
changed. Fusion also allows the user to associate a text, which typically contains 
descriptive information and embedded commands, for example, to run external pro­
grams or display help files. Fusion limits factor and value names to 11 characters, 
with no embedded spaces or punctuation. 
The examples screen is where the factors and values are combined to give re­
sults. These examples are later used by Fusion to build a rule, which is in turn is used 
during consultation to determine a result. The options available to the user in the 
examples screen include adding, deleting, changing, moving, and replicating exam­
ples, each of which occupies one line. The last option, replication, is commonly used 
when a number of similar examples, that differ only slightly, are encountered. The 
maximum number of examples allowed in a KB is 255, but may be fewer depending 
on the memory of the system used. In adding an example, the factors are arranged 
horizontally on the screen. When a factor is highlighted, the possible values for that 
factor are arranged across the top of the screen and may be selected. Numerical data 
can be entered as values for some factors. Numeric quantities are treated either as 
upper bounds, lower bounds, or domains. In the first two cases, the maximum or 
minimum values are extracted, whereas in the third case regions are defined by con­
sidering the values entered in the examples. As an alternative to entering a specific 
value, a "don't care" value can be entered, meaning that the value of this factor is 
useless in deriving the result for this example. As each example is entered, Fusion 
tests for conflicts where the examples are contradictory. If a conflict is found the user 
is warned and the examples are highlighted. 
In the next screen, methods screen. Fusion allows selection of a method for 
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deriving the rules. The major methods are: Optimize, Left-right, Exhaustive, Match, 
and Customize. When Optimize is chosen, the rules are generated so that factors 
that don't affect the selection of a result are eliminated and the number of questions 
that have to be asked to arrive at a result is minimized. 
If it is desired to establish a particular sequence of questions, the Left-right 
method can be chosen. This option would be used mostly in cases where answers 
to some questions are difficult to obtain or costly to answer. This method used in 
conjunction with the Optimize method and the Definitions screen's ability, allows 
moving of the factors around to correspond to the sequence of questions that is 
desired to be asked. The Exhaustive method builds a rule in which all the factors 
appear on every path through the rule. It applies the factors in the same order they 
are on the Definitions screen. Examples are optional with this method. 
The Match method does not build a rule. Instead, it causes a search when the 
advisor runs which matches the user's responses against the examples in the KB. 
The Match method is appropriate for problems with little pattern to them (and 
therefore not amenable to rules). It is also useful when the example data describe or 
diagnose conditions by positive example but there are no available counter-examples 
that describe when none of the results in the result column apply; thus, the KB would 
sometimes give an incorrect result. 
Finally, the Customize method permits building and editing of the rules directly 
on the Rule screen (the screen described next). This method has two main uses: (1) 
rules can be built from scratch when data are in the form of rules or logic charts 
rather than examples, and (2) rules produced by any of the above methods can be 
edited. 
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The rule screen represents the definitions and examples entered previously as a 
tree of choices. Each node of this tree corresponds to a factor to be considered by 
Fusion in the course of a consultation. Results are found at the end of the tree. Each 
path in the tree corresponds to an example entered in the previous screen. 
The next screen is the advisor screen. This screen is the user interface with the 
KB developed. The advisor screen in itself is composed of a set of screen. It starts 
with a preface screen, and displays a separate screen for each question it asks. The 
information given on each screen can be entered, otherwise Fusion default information 
for each screen is displayed. In other words, if the MEMO factor is entered, the text 
associated with this factor is used in the preface screen; otherwise, the user is directly 
asked the first question of the consultation. 
Some of the attractive features of Fusion that are highlighted here are the chain­
ing capabilities, weights and statistics considerations, providing reports and explana­
tions, and commands that can be executed. Aside from the limits on the number of 
factors, results, and examples in a single KB, there are other reasons for using chain­
ing of the rules. Chaining KBs makes debugging easier, since all the relationships 
are localized and easier to understand. For large collections of examples, a break up 
of the KB is necessary if a "Rule exceeds maximum size" error is encountered while 
using the Optimize or Left-right methods for generating the rules. And finally, it may 
be required for a factor to be replaced with several more detailed factors. Therefore, 
to avoid a major modification of the KB, chaining can be used. 
A weight can be entered for each example used for developing the KB. Fusion 
uses the weights entered for each example and works up a set of statistics that takes 
account not only of weights, but of the number of examples, the frequency of results, 
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and the probability of a result. These statistics can be used in advice text to help 
back up a conclusion. 
Fusion provides facilities for printing reports containing the text of every question 
asked during a consultation, and a listing of the possible answers, as well as the actual 
answer provided. Reports can either be generated individually or added to the end 
of existing report files. In addition to a reporting capability, Fusion also has an 
explanation facility which provides the users with reasons for arriving at a particular 
conclusion. Fusion helps out in this regard in several ways. First, the KB used 
by Fusion is pre-compiled, so that the developer can inspect the Rule screen and 
trace the result of a consultation at that moment. Second, Fusion can use the text 
associated with the individual results and examples to provide increased detail in the 
explanation. 
Text associated with factors, values, results, and MEMOs can contain command 
statements. These statements consist of a command followed by the appropriate 
parameters. In particular, command statements allow execution of external programs 
written in Pascal, BASIC, or C, and a complete facility for parameter transfer is 
provided. 
There are many other facilities provided by the 1st Class Fusion, and if one also 
has access to the 1st Class Fusion, Hyper Text, many more are added. In this section, 
the intent is to familiarize the reader with this software to be able to describe the 
development of the KB for FG analysis in later sections. However, before doing so, 
in the following section, the techniques used for developing the Optimized method 
and others are described. 
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The Inductive Inference Engine 
The source for the material presented in this section is [36]. The inductive 
inference machinery is a simple mechanism for discovering a classification rule for a 
collection of objects belonging to classes. Each object must be described in terms 
of fixed attributes, each of which has its own set of possible attribute values. For 
example, "color" might be an attribute with a set of possible values, (red, green, 
blue). 
Let us denote each example as an object and the result of each example as the 
class that other examples might be a member of. A classification rule in the form of 
a decision tree can be constructed for any such collection C of objects. The nodes 
of the tree are the attributes and the links between a parent and child node are the 
possible values of the parent node (attribute). The final nodes are then classes of 
disjoint sets of C's. 
In extreme cases, if C is empty then we associate it arbitrarily with any class. If 
all objects in C belong to the same class, then the decision tree is a leaf bearing that 
class name. Otherwise, C contains representatives of all classes; we select an attribute 
and partition C into disjoint sets C']^,C2, • • •, C'%, where C'l contains those members 
of C that have the value of the selected attribute. Each of these sub collections 
is then handled in turn by the same rule-forming strategy. The outcome is a tree in 
which each leaf carries a class name, and each interior node specifies an attribute to 
be tested with a branch corresponding to each possible value of that attribute. 
To illustrate, the following example is presented, where three attributes are con­
sidered, "height" with values (tall, short), "hair" with values (dark, red, blond), and 
"eyes" with values (blue, brown), and where there are two classes denoted by "+" 
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Table 6.1: Examples and Classes 
height hair eyes class type 
short blond blue + 
tall blond brown -
tall red blue + 
short dark blue -
tall dark blue -
tall blond blue + 
tall dark brown -
short blond brown 
-
and In Table 6.1, a set of examples and their associated classes are listed. 
If the second attribute is selected as the root of the decision tree, this results in 
the tree shown in Figure 6.1. The sub collections corresponding to the values 'dark' 
and 'red' contain objects of only a single class, and so require no further work. If 
we select the third attribute to test for the 'blond' branch, this yields the tree in 
Figure 6.2. Now all sub collections contain objects of one class, so we can replace 
each subcollection by the class name to get the decision three shown in Figure 6.3. 
An object is classified by starting at the root of the decision tree, finding the 
value of the tested attribute in the given object, taking the branch appropriate to that 
value, and continuing in the same fashion until a leaf is reached. This classification 
of a particular object may involve evaluating only a small number of the attributes 
depending on the length of the path from the root of the tree to the appropriate 
leaf. In the above example, the first step is always to inquire about the value of an 
object's "hair" attribute. If this value is "dark" or "red" the object can be classified 
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ihort, dirk, blue: • 
UU, dirk, blue: -
Ull, dirk, brown: • 
{uH, red, blue: + | ihort, blond, blue: + 
till, blond, brown: -
tall, blond, blue; + 
short, blond, brown: ' 
Figure 6.1: One-level decision tree 
hill 
Aort, dark, blue; « 
till, daric, blue: -
tall, daric, brown: -
brown 
(Aort, blond, blue; +1 tall, blond, blue: + j (tall, blond, brown; -ihort, blond, brown: 
Figure 6.2: Two-level decision tree 
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hair 
O 
brown 
© 0 
Figure 6.3: Decision tree with class names 
immediately without looking at its other attributes. If the value is "blond" then its 
value of "eyes" must be determined before classifying it. Therefore, in none of the 
cases, is the value of the "height" attribute needed. This rule-forming procedure will 
always work provided that there are not two objects belonging to different classes but 
having identical values for each attribute; in such cases the attributes are inadequate 
for the classification task. Also, it is generally desirable to construct a tree that 
enables classification of the objects which were not used in its construction, so that 
concluding with classes with an empty set of examples is kept to a minimum. 
So far, the selection process of the attribute used as the root of the decision tree 
was random. This is called the simple-minded algorithm, where the first attribute is 
selected for the root, the second attribute for the next level, and so on. This process 
is unreasonable, since the whole skill in this style of induction lies in selecting a useful 
attribute to test for a given collection of objects so that the Anal tree is in some sense 
minimal (total cost for searching the tree is minimized). 
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The technique used by Quinlan [36], called information-theoretic approach aimed 
at minimizing the expected number of tests to classify an object. A decision tree 
may be regarded as an information source that, given an object, generates a message 
which is the class of that object ("plus" or "minus"). The attribute selection part 
of this technique relies strongly on the plausible assumption that the complexity of 
the decision tree is related to the amount of information conveyed by this message. 
If the probability associated with "plus" and "minus" are and p~, respectively, 
the expected information content of the message is, 
-p'^log2P'^ - p~log2P~. 
The probabilities p can be approximated by the relative frequencies of the example 
in set C; for example, p"^ becomes the proportion of objects in C with class "plus". 
So, M{C) is used to denote the calculation of the expected information content of a 
message from a decision tree for a set C of objects and for an empty set of C, this 
value is defined as zero, in order to establish the induction hypothesis. 
Now, the possible choice of A is considered to be the next attribute to test. The 
partial decision tree is shown in Figure 6.4. The values .4j of attribute A are mutually 
exclusive, so the new expected information content becomes; 
B { C , A )  =  { p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  v a l u e  o f  A  i s  A j )  x M{Ci), 
where again, the probabilities can be replaced by the relative frequencies. Then the 
suggested choice of attribute to test next is that which provides the most information, 
in other words, the one for which 
M { C ) - B { C , A )  
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attribute 
A 
Figure 6.4: Partial decision tree 
is a maximum. 
In the example above, the value of M { C }  is calculated to be 
.W(C') = —3/8Zog2^/8 — 5/8/0320/8 = 0.954bits, 
since in the eight examples provided, three were in the "plus" and five in the "minus" 
classes. In Figure 6.5, the partial tree is depicted if the attribute chosen is "height". 
Testing this attribute, the information still needed for a rule for the "tall" branch is: 
—2/5/0^22/5 — 3/5/0523/5 = 0.971bits, 
and information needed for the "short" branch is: 
-1/3/0^21/3 - 2/3/0^22/3 = 0.9186iis. 
The expected information content is then calculated to be: 
B{C,height) = 5/8 x 0.971 + 3/8 x 0.918 = 0.%lbits, 
116 
height 
tall short 
tall, blond, brown: -
tall, red, blue: + 
tall, dark, blue: -
tall, blond, blue: + 
. tall, dark, brown: -
short, blond, blue: + 
short, dark, blue: -
short, blond, brown: -
Figure 6.5: Binary attribute discrimination 
and, the information gained by testing this attribute is: 
0.954 - 0.951 = OMUits 
which is negligible. Using the same technique, information gained by testing "eyes" 
and "hair" were calculated to be 0.347 and 0.454, respectively. Therefore, using 
"hair" as the root of the decision tree is cost efficient. 
The description of the technique of inductive inference learning was given here 
to convey an understanding of how rules are generated using the Optimize method 
in 1st Class Fusion. This algorithm is used in the development of the learning part 
of the ES. This is referred to in more detail in the next chapter. 
Derivation of Rules for FG Analysis 
By using the inductive learning capability provided by 1st Class Fusion, a rule 
tree for FG analysis was generated. As was described in Section 6.1, 1st Class Fusion 
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uses a table of examples for generating the rule tree. Prior to setting up this table, 
a set of important factors and the associated values must be decided upon. 
A set of important factors used for developing the rule tree for the FG analysis 
is provided in Figure 6.6. Following each factor, the values are listed. The maximum 
limit on the number of characters allowed by 1st Class Fusion for representing factors, 
values, and results is eleven characters. However, 1st Class Fusion permits entering 
a text for each of these items, where a clear description can be included. This text 
is also provided in Figure 6.6. 
The values that describe the characteristics of the DN signal and slope were 
decided upon by categorizing the repeating behavior in these plots and formalizing 
them. For example, it is often observed that the value of slope suddenly increases 
to one and then gradually decreases. This characteristic was formalized as "sharp" 
slope. This was done by visual inspection of all of the plots included in the Ap­
pendix. For the sake of demonstrating the applicability of inductive learning in the 
development of this ES, it was justifiable to use this procedure; however, this process 
would ultimately have to be automated. This automation can be accomplished by 
using pattern recognition techniques. By using a pattern recognition technique, the 
behaviors are automatically categorized by matching patterns. When a new pattern 
is encountered, a new value is included for the associated factor. 
The only piece of information extracted from the plot of the activity of FG 
isotopes was the increase in activity values due to the occurrence of a breach, even 
though more information is available in these plots, for example, the total volume 
of gas and the release rate. Access to this information becomes important when 
the indication of burnup level and alloy type of breach elements are included in the 
Definitions for Knowledge Base FGAS 6:58 pm 10/23/1990 
DNeBK_BB 
yes 
no 
CHAN_IN_DN 
no 
stepincr 
spikes 
sharpspike 
[Is the DN signal at background level prior to the breach?] 
[Describe the behavior of the DM signal after breach:] 
[No indication of an increase in the DN signal.] 
[Step increase.] 
[Spike with a wide width (more than a few hours).] 
[Sike with a short width (a few minutes).] 
INCR_IN_DN [Enter the increase in the level of the DN signal. ] 
INCR_IN_135 [Enter the magnitude of largest spike in Xel35m activity.] 
INCR_IN_87 [Enter the magnitude of largest spike in Kr87 activity.] 
INCR_IN_133 [Enter the maximum level that Xel33 activity reached.] 
SLOPE 
erratic 
sharp 
grad_incr 
burp 
[Indicate the characteristics of the slope at time of breach?] 
[The slope shows erratic behavior, changes within minutes 
between 0.2 to 0.8] 
[Sudden increase to one, then decreased similarly 
to the activity of Xel33.] 
[Gradual increase and decrease to/from one 
(displayed in a few days period).] 
[Slope remains between 0.4 and 0.7.] 
DIAGNOSTIC [The result is 
] 
met-fc [Metal Fuel Column Failure.] 
met-dimple [Failure in the dimple region of a MK-II metal fuel.] 
met-weld [Failure due to anomoly in the welding of the metal fuel.] 
met-not-det [Failure in the metal fuel is not detected due to the 
overriding effects of previously breached mixed-oxide 
elements.] 
ox-fc [Mixed-oxide breach along the fuel column.] 
ox-fc-mul-b [Mixed-oxide failure in the fuel column region in the 
presence of other mixed-oxide failed elements in-core.] 
ox-plenum [Mixed-oxide failure in the plenum region.] 
pre-b-oxide [Mixed-oxide element that had already breached in the fuel column 
region is present in-core.] 
Figure 6.6: A listing of the definitions, values, and final results 
119 
diagnosis. As was mentioned in the analysis of the FG data, we refrained from 
providing this diagnostic capability due to the lack of analytical methods that allow 
us to model the FG storage and release, unavailability of a theoretical model that 
allows for subtracting the effects of the previous breaches, and lack of information on 
identification of the breach elements, i.e., unavailability of TG information on some 
breaches. 
.\lso included in Figure 6.6 are the final results. These results or diagnoses are 
the different types of breaches that occurred in the past five years. The table of 
examples that was used to generated the rule tree is depicted in Figure 6.7 and the 
rule tree is shown in Figure 6.8. The number associated with each example in Figure 
6.7 is the same as the number allocated to each breach in the tables provided in the 
previous chapter, with the exception of examples 42 and 43. Both of these examples 
were extracted from the last breach in 1990, since several distinct sudden gas releases 
occurred from the element in subassembly X470. 
The procedure followed for deriving the factors, and the associated values given in 
Figure 6.6, was as follows. At first, a complete set of factors and the associated values 
was conservatively defined. In other words, all possible factors in the diagnostics were 
included. Then, for each of the breaches occurring in the past five years, an example 
was set up by extracting the value of each factor from the plots in the Appendix. 
As a result, a comprehensive table of examples was formed. The rule tree was then 
generated by using the Optimized method. When the Optimized method is used, 1st 
Class Fusion provides a listing of factors that were not used in generating the rule 
tree. By using this list, the unimportant factors were eliminated from the table of 
examples and the second rule tree was generated. It was expected that the second 
Examples for Knowledge Base FGAS 
DMeBK_BB men 
l: yes spikes 600. 100. 
2t no steplncr 1000. 110. 
3% no steplncr 1000. 90. 
4% no no 0. 0. 
5*. no steplncr 1000. 100. 
62 yes spikes 1500. 200. 
7t yes spikes 2500. 400. 
82 yes steplncr 2000. 0. 
91 no steplncr 1000. 200. 
10: no no 0. 75. 
11: no no 0. 80. 
12: no no 0. 40. 
13: no no 0. 150. 
14: yes steplncr 1000. 0. 
15: yes spikes 600. 300. 
16: no no 0. 0. 
17: no no 0. 0. 
18: yes-. steplncr 1500. 400. 
19: yes ' no 0. 0. 
20: yes no 0. 0. 
21: yes no 0. 10. 
22: yes no 0. 5. 
23: yes no 0. 0. 
24: yes no 0. 10. 
25: yes no 0. 0. 
26: yes no 0. 0. 
27: yes no 0. 0. 
28: yes no 0. 0. 
29: yes no 0. 0. 
30: yes no 0. 0. 
31: yes no 0. 0. 
32: yes no 0. 150. 
33: yes no 0. 0. 
34: yes no 0. 0. 
35: yes no 0. 0. 
36: yes sharpspike 500. 100. 
372 yes no 0. 30. 
362 yes no 0. 0. 
39: yes spikes 2000. 35. 
40: yes sharpspike 600. 0. 
41: yes sharpspike 200.0 300. 
42: yes no 0. 20. 
43: yes no 0. 75. 
6:59 pm 10/23/1990 
Illc _IH_135 II1CT_III_B7 IHCn III 133 SLOPE 
200. 
400. 
300. 
0. 
400. 
500.0 
1000. 
50. 
325. 
140. 
150. 
120. 
750. 
0.  
1400. 
0 .  
0.  
500. 
10. 
0 .  
15. 
20. 
10. 
50. 
7.5 
6.0 
100. 
40. 
50. 
7.5 
7. 
500. 
50.0 
0 .  
15. 
300. 
125. 
25. 
150. 
0 .  
750.0 
100. 
400. 
5000. 
5000. 
0.  
20000. 
20000. 
* 
1000. 
20000. 
5000. 
20000. 
10000. 
25000. 
* 
13000. 
BOO. 
2000. 
3000. 
7000. 
3750.0 
800. 
2200.0 
2200. 
2000. 
1000. 
2000. 
5000. 
3000. 
3000. 
7500.0 
7500. 
6000. 
15000. 
10000. 
10000. 
BOOO. 
5000. 
3000.0 
35000. 
300. 
3500. 
5000. 
15000. 
erratic 
erratic 
erratic 
burp 
erratic 
erratic 
erratic 
burp 
erratic 
erratic 
grad_lncr 
grad^incr 
erratic 
burp 
erratic 
sharp 
sharp 
erratic 
grad_lncr 
grad_incr 
erratic 
erratic 
sharp 
erratic 
sharp 
sharp 
erratic 
sharp 
erratic 
sharp 
grad incr 
erratic 
sharp 
sharp 
sharp 
erratic 
erratic 
sharp 
erratic 
burp 
erratic 
sharp 
sharp 
DIAGNOSTIC weight 
ox-tc 1 .00  
ox-tc-Bul-b 1 .00  
ox-ïc-Bul-b 1.00  
net-not-det 1 .00  
ox-tc-nul-b 1 .00  
ox-Ic 1.00  
ox-fc 1 .00  
pre-b-oxide 1.00 
ox-fc-BUl-b 1.00 
met-fc 1.00 
net-dimple 1 .00  
net-dimple 1.00 
ox-fc 1.00 
pre-b-oxide 1 .00  
ox-lc 1 .00  
net-weld 1.00 
net-weld 1 .00  
ox-fc 1 .00  
net-dimple 1 .00  
net-dimple l.OO 
net-fc 1 .00  
net-fc 1.00 
net-weld 1 .00  
net-fc 1 .00  
net-weld 1 .00  
net-weld 1 .00  
net-fc 1 .00  
net-weld 1.00 
net-fc 1.00 
net-weld 1 .00  
net-weld 1.00 
net-fc 1.00 
net-weld 1.00 
net-weld l.OD 
net-weld l.OO 
net-fc 1.00 
net-fc 1.00 
net-weld l.OO 
ox-fc 1.00 
ox-plenum 1.00 
net-fc 1.00 
ox-plenum 1.00 
ox-plenum 1.00 
to O 
Figure 6.7: The listing of examples 
121 
1: SLOPE?? 
2: |-erratic:INCR IN DN?? 
3; 
4 : 
5: 
6 :  
7: 
8 :  
9: 
10; 
11: 
12: 
13; 
14: 
15; 
16: 
17: 
18: 
19: 
20: 
21: 
- <550.00:INCR III 133?? 
I- <16500.00: 
L &16500.00: 
met-fc 
ox-fc 
^550.00:DN@BK_BB?? 
1-yes: ox-fc 
ox-fc-mul-b no: 
•sharp:INCR_IN_135?? 
I- <10.00; 
L &10.00: 
•grad_incr:INCR_IN_8 7 ? ? 
met-weld 
ox-plenum 
• <8.50!INCR IN 87?? 
I- <3.5OT 
2:3.50: 
met-dimple 
met-weld 
met-dimple L ^8.50; 
Lburp:CHAN_IN_DN?? 
-no; 
•stepincr;— 
spikes: 
'-sharpspike; 
met-not-det 
pre-b-oxide 
no data 
ox-plenum 
end of rule 
Figure 6.8: The rule tree for FG analysis 
rule tree would be identical to the first one. The comprehensive list of factors initially 
given to Fusion includes the following effects: (a) the characteristics of the cumulative 
activity, such as a step increase in the cumulative activity, the value of the slope of the 
cumulative activity prior to the breach, (b) the level of the FG activity prior to the 
breach, (c) whether the short half-life gas was seen at the same time or after the long 
half-life gas appeared (heuristic rule), and (d) whether or not the increase in DN signal 
lagged the appearance of the FG and by how long (heuristic rule). However, after 
generating the rule tree by using the Optimize method, it was realized that these 
factors were unimportant in deriving conclusions from the rule tree, and therefore 
they were eliminated from the example table. 
In the description of the inductive learning technique that was utilized to develop 
the Optimize method, it was indicated that the factor contributing the most in the 
diagnosis appears as the root of the rule tree. The characteristics of the slope was 
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the root which indicates the importance of this factor in the FG analysis. 
To test the rule tree, the query option provided by Fusion was used for diagnosing 
all breaches that occurred since May of 1986. All breaches were diagnosed correctly, 
as was expected. Of coarse, since only the information from all breaches that occurred 
in the past five years was included in the example table for developing the rule tree, 
we were not able to test this rule tree by diagnosing a breach that was not included 
in the example table. 
Figures, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12 provide examples of reports of the query sessions 
for diagnosing breach 1, 9, 22, and 34 that are specified in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. 
The Customized method was then used to incorporate the heuristic rules that 
were used during the analysis of data, since, in attempting to enter them as factors, 
they were found to be unimportant. However, since the rules generated by inductive 
learning were few in number and conclusive on their own, including the heuristic rules 
only introduced inefficiencies. 
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Indicate the characteristics of the slope at time of breach? 
* The slope shows erratic behavior, changes within minutes 
* Sudden increase to one, then decreased similarly 
* Gradual increase and decrease to/from one 
* Slope remains between 0.4 and 0.7. 
==> The slope shows erratic behavior, changes within minutes 
Enter the increase in the level of the DN signal. 
* Enter a number: 
==> 600.00 
Is the DN signal at background level prior to the breach? 
* yes 
* no 
=•=> yes 
The result is 
Mixed-oxide breach along the fuel column. 
End of Session Report for Knowledge Base FGAS 7:30 pm 10/23/1990 
Figure 6.9: Query session report of breach 1 
124 
Indicate the characteristics of the slope at time of breach? 
* The slope shows erratic behavior, changes within minutes 
* Sudden increase to one, then decreased similarly 
* Gradual increase and decrease to/from one 
* Slope remains between 0.4 and 0.7. 
—> The slope shows erratic behavior, changes within minutes 
Enter the Increase in the level of the DN signal. 
* Enter a number: 
"«»> 1000.00 
Is the DN signal at background level prior to the breach? 
* yes 
* no 
==> no 
The result is 
Mixed-oxide failure in the fuel column region in the 
presence of other mixed-oxide failed elements in-core. 
End of Session Report for Knowledge Base FGAS 7:32 pm 10/23/1990 
Figure 6.10; Query session report of breach 9 
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Indicate the characteristics of the slope at time of breach? 
* The slope shows erratic behavior, changes within minutes 
* Sudden increase to one, then decreased similarly 
* Gradual increase and decrease to/from one 
* Slope remains between 0.4 and 0.7. 
==> The slope shows erratic behavior, changes within minutes 
Enter the increase in the level of the ON signal. 
* Enter a number: 
""> 0.00 
) 
Enter the maximum level that Xel33 activity reached. 
* Enter a number; 
==> 2200.00 
The result is 
Metal Fuel Column Failure. 
End of Session Report for Knowledge Base gGAS 7:33 pm 10/23/1990 
Figure 6.11: Query session report of breach 22 
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Indicate the characteristics of the slope at time of breach? 
* The slope shows erratic behavior, changes within minutes 
* Sudden increase to one, then decreased similarly 
* Gradual increase and decrease to/from one 
* Slope remains between 0.4 and 0.7. 
•<•> Sudden increase to one, then decreased similarly 
Enter the magnitude of largest spike in Xel35m activity. 
* Enter a number: 
«•"> 0.00 
The result is 
Failure due to anomoly in the welding of the metal fuel. 
End of Session Report for Knowledge Base FGAS 7; 3-4 pm 10/23/1990 
Figure 6.12: Query session report of breach 34 
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CHAPTER 7. DESIGN OF THE EXPERT SYSTEM AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DIRECTION 
In analyzing the FG data of EBR-II, more complexities were encountered than in 
analyzing the FG data of a commercial power plant, since EBR-II is an experimental 
facility where various fuel types are always used in-core, whereas, in commercial power 
plants only a few different types of fuel are utilized. Therefore, a database for storing 
information on the fuel elements that have been used in EBR-II is included in the 
design of the ES. The data on the fuel loading of EBR-II (including information on 
burnup, and alloy type) would allow for a more comprehensive diagnosis of failed fuel 
elements; in particular, information on alloy types and burnup levels can be included 
in the diagnosis. 
Although the experience gained from the FG analysis of the data gathered for 
the past five years was invaluable, it was not sufficient for generating a comprehensive 
rule tree, simply because of the unavailability of some of the diagnostic tools (e.g., 
extent of the breach from DN analysis, the FG volume released from the breached 
element, a true calculation of cumulative activity where the loss effects are taken into 
account, etc.) or due to the deficiencies of some diagnostic tools (e.g., TG analysis). 
Due to lack of tag information (either caused by not tagging or by an untimely 
purging of the cover gas), more than a third of the breaches that occurred since May 
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of 1986 were not identified at the time of breach by TG analysis. However, in the 
design of the ES all of the diagnostic tools developed to this date were included. Also, 
the capability of the addition of new diagnostic tools in the KB of this ES must be 
provided in an automated fashion. 
The diagnostic tools and the rule-based component is depicted in Figure 7.1. 
Since, this ES will be used on a real-time basis, the analytical components (i.e., 
GIRAFFE, and FG analysis) have also to be run on a real-time basis. Whereas 
POLYFAIL (used for TG analysis) has to be executed only when a new breach occurs 
or when the tag ratios have to be modified for correcting for burnup and buildup of 
tag isotopes. GIRAFFE, relatively requires the longest computation time, has been 
modified so that it can be run on a parallel processing system. These analytical 
components have been developed in FORTRAN and are modified to be run on a 
real-time basis. The characteristics of the output of some of these diagnostic tools 
must be analyzed by pattern recognition techniques, as was referred to earlier on. 
It was demonstrated that the inductive learning technique is efficient in diagnos­
ing breaches in EBR-II. However, similar to the analytical components, the ES must 
be able to include, (a) a new event, (b) a new diagnostic tool, or (c) a new pattern 
that is detected in the output of one of the diagnostic tools, on a real-time basis. 
Finally, to summarize the design features of the ES for fuel failure diagnosis in 
EBR-II developed by using an inductive learning inference engine, the following items 
must be taken into consideration, 
• A database must be available so that the ES is capable of extracting information 
on the breached element, 
• The execution of the analytical components which provide the diagnostic tools 
Delayed Heubron Analysis 
GIRAFFE 
Fission gas Analysis Tag Gas Analysis 
POLXFAIL 
Alarms 
Shubdown 
Advice 
Displays 
Safe RBCB 
Operabion 
Measure of the extent 
of the breach 
List of the suspected 
breached elements 
Radioactivity due to 
the delayed neutron 
emitters in sodium 
Activity of the seven 
fission gas isotopes 
in cover gas 
Height percent of tag 
gas isotopes detected 
in cover gas 
Cumulative Xe-133 
activity corrected 
for background 
Release to birth 
ratio aa a function 
of isotopic decay 
constants and time 
Corrected activity • 
of the seven fission 
gas isotopes for 
CGC3 
Variation of the 
corrected activity pf 
fission gas isotopes 
with time 
Diagnostic Expert System for Surveillance and Identification of Fuel Failure 
Figure 7.1: Schematic of the design of the expert system 
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must be controlled in an automated fashion by the ES. 
The characteristics of the output of some diagnostic tools must be analyzed by 
pattern recognition techniques. 
When a new event (a new breach type) is detected, a new result must be 
included in the example table, and the rule tree must be regenerated. 
When a breach occurs that is within the domain of the expertise of the KB 
(more simply, when similar breach types are already included in the example 
table) a new example must be entered into the example table and the rules 
regenerated. 
When a new diagnostic tool becomes available new factors must be introduced 
to the example table and the rule tree regenerated. 
When a new pattern or piece of information is identified, it must be included 
in the example table by introducing a new value for the factor associated with 
the diagnostic tool and a new rule tree must be regenerated. 
All of the above items must be performed in an automated fashion, with human 
interaction minimized. 
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APPENDIX PLOTS OF FG ANALYSIS FROM MAY OF 1986 TO 
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